Philosophy 3865:

Probability and Epistemology

Spring, 2011

Professor Joel Velasco

Class meets Tuesdays and Thursdays, 1:25-2:40 in GSH G76

This is a tentative schedule/reading list:

- Required Reading
- Hacking, Chapter 4
- Eells, Appendix 1 of
*Probabilistic Causality*

- Extra Reading

- Required Readings
- Hacking, Chapters 5-8

- Extra Readings
- Some handy probability facts (due to Titelbaum and Hájek)
- Fitelson, A Decision Procedure for Probability Calculus with Applications
- Also, Fitelson's
**PrSAT**website - Appendix 2 of Ellery Eells's Probabilistic Causality
- Lyon, The Philosophy of Probability (first two sections)
- Hájek, What Conditional Probability Could Not Be
- Easwaran, What Conditional Probability Must (Almost) Be
- Hájek, What Conditional Probability Also Could Not Be
- NY Lottery example
- Skyrms, Zeno's Paradox of Measure
- Skyms, On Infinitesimals

- Required Reading
- Hacking, Ch 11 + 12
- Hájek, Interpretations of Probability,
*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(through 3.3)

- Extra Reading

- Required Readings
- Hájek, Interpretations of Probability,
*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(3.4) - Gillies, Varieties of Propensity
- Lewis, A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance

- Hájek, Interpretations of Probability,
- Extra Readings
- Eagle, Twenty-One Arguments Against Propensity Analyses of Probability
- Lewis, Postscript to A Subjectivist's Guide
- Lewis, Humean Supervenience Debugged
- Loewer, David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance
- Vranas, Who's Afraid of Undermining?
- Vranas, Have Your Cake And Eat It Too: The Old Principal Principle Reconciled With The New
- Meacham, Two Mistakes Regarding the Principle Principal

- Required Readings
- Hacking Ch 13 & 14
- Hájek, Interpretations of Probability,
*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(3.5) - Kyburg, Subjective Probability: Criticisms, Reflections, and Problems (a mistake in the paper)

- Extra Readings
- Ramsey, Truth and Probability (the earliest dutch book argument and representation theorem)
- Kemeny, Fair Bets and Inductive Probabilities (proves the converse dutch book theorem)
- Skyrms, Coherence (defends dutch books)
- Christensen, Dutch Books Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers
- Hájek, Dutch Book Arguments
- Vineberg, The Notion of Consistency for Partial Beliefs
- Armendt, Dutch Books, Additivity, and Utility Theory
- Schick, Dutch Bookies and Money Pumps
- Maher, Depragmatized Dutch Book Arguments (against Christensen)
- Weatherson, Begging the Question and Bayesianism
- Hájek, Scotching Dutch Books

- Required Readings
- Hacking Ch 15
- Lewis, Why Conditionalize?
- van Fraassen, Belief and the Will
- Christensen, Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs

- Extra Readings

- Required Readings
- Kelly, The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
- Elga, Reflection and Disagreement
- Jehle and Fitelson, What is the Equal Weight View?

- Extra Readings
- The literature on disagreement is exploding right now. Here is a recent volume on the topic: Disagreement
- Kelly, Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence (from the Feldman volume)

- Required Readings
- Extra Readings
- Lewis, Attitudes De Dicto and De Se
- Arntzenius, Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection
- Hitchcock, Beauty and the Bets
- Bradley and Leitgeb, When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart
- Titelbaum, The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs
- Briggs, Putting a Value on Beauty

- Required Readings
- Extra Readings
- Maher, Joyce's Arguments for Probabilism
- Seidenfeld, Calibration, Coherence, and Scoring Rules
- Eriksson and Hájek, What are Degrees of Belief?
- Joyce, How Probabilities Reflect Evidence
- Joyce, Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
- Hájek, Arguments for-or against-Probabilism
- Leitgeb and Pettigrew, An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy
- Leitgeb and Pettigrew, An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy

- Required Reading
- Sober, An Introduction to Bayesian Epistemology (if you see funny symbols try downloading it and opening in adobe rather than online)
- Eagle, Introduction to Evidence and Probability: Bayesian Confirmation Theory from Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings
- Howson and Urbach, Bayesian vs. Non-Bayesian Approaches to Confirmation (originally from Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach)
- Maher, Subjective and Objective Confirmation

- Extra Reading
- Sober, Bayesianism, its Scope and Limits
- Sober, Epistemology for Empiricists
- Earman & Salmon, The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses (parts 1 + 4), Chapter 2 of
*Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* - Maher, Confirmation Theory

- Required Readings
- Extra Readings
- Forster and Sober, How to tell when Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories will Provide More Accurate Predictions
- Strevens, The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses
- Fitelson and Waterman, Reply to Strevens
- Strevens, Reply to Fitelson and Waterman
- Fitelson and Waterman, Reply #2
- Weisberg, Commutivity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers
- Sober, Mathematics and Indispensability
- Colyvan, Contrastive Empiricism and Indispensability
- Colyvan, Confirmation and Indispensability

- Required Reading
- Adler, Reliabilist Justification (or Knowledge) as Good Truth-Ratio
- Comesana, What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism?
- Achinstein, Evidence, High Probability, and Belief (Chapter 6 of
*The Book of Evidence*)

- Extra Reading
- Roush,
*Tracking Truth*- this book tries to spell out knowledge and justification with a truth-tracking Nozick style account but wants to use conditional probabilities for tracking conditions

- Roush,

- Required Readings
- Hawthorne and Bovens, The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief
- Kaplan, A Bayesian Theory of Rational Acceptance
- Eells, On a Recent Theory of Rational Acceptance

- Extra Readings
- Wheeler, A Review of the Lottery Paradox
- Levi, Probability and Evidence
- Jeffrey, Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief
- Kaplan, Rational Acceptance
- Maher, Acceptance (from Betting on Theories)
- Sturgeon, Reason and the Grain of Belief
- Sturgeon, Belief, Reason, and Logic

- Required Readings
- Pollock, Problems for Bayesian Epistemology
- Foley, Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis
- Hájek and Hartmann, Bayesian Epistemology

- Extra Readings