Philosophy 3865:
Probability and Epistemology
Spring, 2011

Professor Joel Velasco

Class meets Tuesdays and Thursdays, 1:25-2:40 in GSH G76

Course syllabus

Description:
This course will examine a few aspects of the relationship between Probability and Epistemology. In doing so, we will look at the foundations of probability theory, interpretations of probability, arguments for and against probabilism (the view that we ought to have degrees of belief that are probabilities), conditionalization, Bayesian confirmation theory, confirmational holism, and finally, the relationship between degrees of belief and binary beliefs.
Requirements:
Attendance in class and participation in discussion, are required and will affect your grade.  There will be one short paper, one medium-length paper, and one longer final paper.
Office hours:
My office hours are Mon 11:00-12:00 and Thur 3:00-4:00, or by appointment, in 228 Goldwin Smith Hall.
Books available at the university bookstore:
Ian Hacking, Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic, Cambridge University Press, 2001 (= Hacking)

This is a tentative schedule/reading list:

Week 1 (1/25) - Introduction to the course/basic logic and venn diagrams

Week 2 (2/1) - Conditional Probabilities, Bayes Theorem

Week 3 (2/8) - Interpreting Probabilities I - Indifference and Frequencies

Week 4 (2/15) - Interpreting Probabilities II - Propensity and Chance

***First homework assignment - Due 3-3***

Week 5 (2/22) - Interpreting Probabilities III - Subjective Degrees of Belief

Week 6 (3/1) - Conditionalization and Reflection

Week 7 (3/8) - Disagreement

Week 8 (3/15) - Sleeping Beauty and Self-Locating Beliefs

Week * (3/22) - No Class - Spring Break

***Second homework assignment - Due 4-7***

Week 9 (3/29) - Scoring Rule arguments for Probabilism

Week 10 (4/5) - Bayesian Confirmation Theory

Week 11 (4/12)- Confirmational Holism

Week 12 (4/19) - Evidence and Justification

***Final homework assignment - Due 5-19***

Week 13 (4/26) - Connections between beliefs and degrees of belief

Week 14 (5/3) - Criticisms of Bayesian Epistemology