Back to required readings:

Many of the very helpful comments below are due to Mike Titelbaum

On Hempel and the Ravens:

• Hempel, Studies in the Logic of Confirmation (Part I and Part II)
• Hempel, A Purely Syntactical Definition of Confirmation
• Hempel, The White Shoe: No Red Herring
• Sober, Chapter 2 of Reconstructing the Past. (Particularly relevant to us is section 2.5)
• Fitelson, "The Paradox of Confirmation". (Applies contemporary Subjective Bayesian confirmation theory to the Paradox of the Ravens.)
• Fitelson and Hawthorne, "How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens". (Extended version of "The Paradox of Confirmation", with extra techy results. A truly deep cut.)
  

On Grue

• Goodman, from Chapter III of Fact, Fiction, Forecast
• Goodman, "A Query on Confirmation". (The first time Goodman presented something like the grue problem—actually a cleaner presentation of the problem from a logical point of view.)
• Hooker, "Goodman, 'Grue' and Hempel". (Makes the case that Hempel's theory doesn't fall victim to grue in the way Goodman thinks it does. This article is from 1967!)
• Sober, No Model No Inference: A Bayesian Primer on the Grue Problem

On Carnap and Logical Theories

• Carnap, On Inductive Logic and preface to the second edition of Logical Foundations of Probability.
  
• For a more accessible description of the mathematics of Carnap's theory, see Section 3.3 of Fitelson's "Inductive Logic".
• Fine, "Logical (Conditional) Probability". (Argues that a Carnap-style approach faces insuperable language-dependence problems.)
• Maher, "Explication of Inductive Probability". (Argues that Fine might not be quite right about that!)
• Titelbaum, "Not Enough There There: Evidence, Reasons, and Language Independence". (Argues that all objective theories of confirmation like Carnap's and Hempel's will ultimately have language-dependence problems, then evaluates the significance of that fact.)

On Bayesian Confirmation Measures

• Hajek and Joyce, "Confirmation". (This encyclopedia-style piece has some nice review of confirmation material we've been working through lately, plus a perspective on the rival-confirmation-measures debate different from what you'll get from Eells and Fitelson below.)
• Fitelson, Evidence of evidence is not (necessarily) evidence
• Fitelson, "The Plurality of Bayesian Confirmation Measures and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity". (Introduces the issue of how best to measure confirmation.)
• Eells and Fitelson, "Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support". (If you're only going to read one of these pieces on choosing a confirmation measure, I'd choose this one.)
• Crupi, Tentori, Gonazlez, "On Bayesian Measures of Evidential Support: Theoretical and Empirical Issues". (Proposes a new confirmation measure that hadn't been considered in the literature before, then conducts actual studies with subjects to elicit their judgments about what supports what and to what degree.)
• Roche and Shogenji, "Confirmation, Transitivity, and Moore: The Screening-Off Approach".