

Finally, there is the problem of contradiction. If intelligence has its maximum exemplar, then stupidity would have to have its maximum exemplar as well. By Aquinas's argument, this leads us to say that there is a single being who is both maximally intelligent and maximally stupid. But this is impossible. That concludes what I want to say about Aquinas's fourth way.

CRITICIZING AN ARGUMENT VERSUS SHOWING THE ARGUMENT'S CONCLUSION IS FALSE

None of the four arguments I've discussed here is successful. Does this mean there is no God? It means no such thing. There may be other arguments for the existence of God that are convincing. That the four arguments discussed here don't work doesn't mean that no argument will work. Not one word has been said here that shows that atheism is true. All we have seen is that some arguments for theism are flawed. In the next chapter, I'll consider Aquinas's fifth argument for the existence of God. Maybe it will fare better.

Review Questions

1. What objections are there to the first cause argument?
2. What is the Birthday Fallacy? How does it figure in the discussion of Aquinas's arguments?
3. Explain what it means for an object to be necessary or contingent. What is a "possible world"?
4. How are necessity and eternality related? How does this bear on Aquinas's third argument?
5. What is a reductio argument? Give an example.
6. What is the difference between necessity and certainty? What is meant by saying that necessity is "objective"?
7. What would it mean for something to be a first cause without being God? What would it mean for something to necessarily exist without being God?

Problems for Further Thought

1. I formulated Aquinas's proofs by having him talk about objects that exist in "nature" (in "the natural world"). What does "nature" include? Does it include just the things we can see or hear or touch or taste or smell? After all, the selection from Aquinas in the Readings translates Aquinas as talking about the "sensible" world. How would interpreting his argument in this way affect its plausibility? What other interpretations of "nature" make sense in this context?

2. In discussing Aquinas's third proof, I talked about Charlie the atom as an example of a thing that is both eternal and contingent. Could something exist that is both necessary and noneternal? It would exist at *some* time in each possible world, though it would not exist at *all* times in the actual world. Can you give an example of such a thing?
3. I criticized Aquinas's third argument by discussing numbers, which I claimed exist necessarily. Can the argument be reformulated so that this objection no longer applies?
4. I criticized Aquinas's fourth argument by discussing "maximum stupidity." Can Aquinas reply to this objection by claiming that stupidity is just the absence of intelligence?

CHAPTER 5

The Design Argument

There are three main traditional arguments for the existence of God—the cosmological argument, the design argument, and the ontological argument. Aquinas's first, second, and third ways, surveyed in the previous chapter, are instances of the first. The cosmological argument takes different forms, but all cite general features of the whole universe as evidence that there is a God. The second type of traditional argument—the design argument—is the one we'll consider in the present chapter; the ontological argument will occupy our attention in Chapter 8.

Aquinas's fifth argument for the existence of God is an instance of what has come to be called the Argument from Design. The design argument has a variety of forms, some of which I'll describe. To start things off, here is a formulation that is close to the one Aquinas uses:

- (1) Among objects that act for an end, some have minds whereas others do not.
- (2) An object that acts for an end, but does not itself have a mind, must have been designed by a being that has a mind.
- (3) Hence, there exists a being with a mind who designed all mindless objects that act for an end.

Hence, God exists.

Note as a preliminary point that the transition from (2) to (3) commits the Birthday Fallacy described in Chapter 4. If each mindless object that acts for an end has a designer, it doesn't follow that there is a *single* designer of all the mindless objects that act for an end.

GOAL-DIRECTED SYSTEMS

What does Aquinas mean by “act for an end”? This phrase corresponds to the modern idea of a goal-directed system. Human beings act for an end because they have desires; these desires represent the ends or purposes or goals to which behavior is directed. Human beings are capable of goal-directed behavior because they have minds. Consider, however, a different example: a guided missile. It is a goal-directed system. Its goal or function is to reach and destroy its target. If the target veers off to the side, the missile can adjust its behavior so that it will achieve its purpose. Guided missiles are goal-directed systems, but they don’t have minds. How is this possible? The answer is consistent with what Aquinas says in premise (2). Guided missiles are *artifacts*. They are devices built by creatures with minds—namely, human beings. This is how missiles obtained the machinery that allows them to engage in goal-directed behavior.

Are there other examples of goal-directed systems besides human beings and artifacts? Nonhuman organisms provide a third category. Even bacteria, which evidently don’t have beliefs and desires, seek out nutrients and avoid poisonous chemicals. It seems plausible to describe them as having the goal of surviving and reproducing. They are able to modify their behavior to achieve these ends.

Does the list stop here—with human beings, artifacts, and nonhuman organisms? Aquinas followed Aristotle in thinking that even inanimate objects such as rocks and comets have goals. This idea pretty much went out of fashion with the Scientific Revolution in the seventeenth century. It now seems implausible to describe a rock as being hard “in order to resist destruction.” It also seems strange to say that rocks fall toward the center of the Earth when they are released “in order to attain the location that it is in their nature to seek.” But this is how Aristotle thought about rocks, and Aquinas followed him here. Both thought that everything, whether living or not, should be understood *teleologically*—that is, as a goal-directed system. (This will be discussed further in Chapter 34.) I won’t take issue with this general teleological picture, except to note that it is far more encompassing than the one provided by modern science. However, this point does not affect the design argument as I have formulated it. What is required is just that *some* mindless objects are goal-directed.

TWO KINDS OF DESIGN ARGUMENT

It will be useful to distinguish two kinds of design argument. Aquinas would have been willing to endorse them both. David Hume (1711–1776), who examined various design arguments in his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (1779), discusses both sorts. I’ll call these two sorts of arguments *global* design arguments and *local* design arguments.

A global design argument cites some general feature of the whole universe and argues that this feature should be explained by the hypothesis that it is the product of intelligent design. An example would be the argument that proposes to explain why the laws of nature are simple. Newton himself argued that the simplicity of natural laws is evidence that there exists an intelligent and perfect God who was their author.

A local design argument focuses on a more specific feature that one or more object in the universe has and claims that the hypothesis that God exists is the best or the only plausible explanation of that fact. The example I’ll consider here concerns features of the organisms we observe on Earth. They are goal-directed systems; they are complex systems equipped with the ability to modify their behavior so that they can survive and reproduce. In this Chapter, I’ll begin with the local argument just mentioned, in which it is special features of living things (including ourselves) that are said to require explanation. In Chapter 7, I’ll return to design arguments that are global.

PALEY’S WATCH

In the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century in Great Britain, design arguments were the rage. Numerous books were published arguing that the existence of God was required to explain this or that feature of the world we observe. One of the most influential works of this sort was produced by William Paley (1743–1805). Whereas Aquinas formulated his version of the design argument as a deductively valid argument, I’m going to interpret Paley’s argument as an abductive argument, an inference to the best explanation.

Paley’s striking formulation of the design argument goes like this: Suppose you were walking on a beach (actually, Paley talks about walking on a “heath”) and found a watch lying on the sand. Opening it up, you see it is a complex and intricate piece of machinery. You also see that the parts of the watch work together to allow the hands to measure out equal intervals of time with considerable precision. What could explain the existence and characteristics of this object?

*H*₁: The Random Hypothesis

One hypothesis to consider I will call the *Random Hypothesis*. By the random action of the waves on the sand, a watch was accidentally produced. Even if you think that this explanation is possible, I bet you agree that it isn’t very plausible. The idea that waves beating on sand could produce a useful object of such intricacy doesn’t make a lot of sense. It is about as plausible as suggesting that a monkey randomly pounding on a typewriter will write out the complete works of Shakespeare.

*H*₂: The Design Hypothesis

A far more plausible explanation is the *Design Hypothesis*. The intricacy and usefulness of the watch suggest that it is the product of intelligence. This hypothesis says that the watch exists because there was a watchmaker who produced it.

Why do we think the Design Hypothesis is more plausible than the Random Hypothesis? If there were a designer at work, then it wouldn’t be surprising that the watch is complex and well suited to the task of measuring temporal intervals. If, however, the only process at work were waves pounding on sand, then it would be enormously surprising that the watch has these characteristics. The observed features of

the watch are possible, according to each hypothesis. But they are rather probable according to one and vastly improbable according to the other. In preferring the Design Hypothesis, we prefer the hypothesis that strains our credulity less.

I hope you see that Paley's argument uses the Surprise Principle described in Chapter 3. You've made some observations (call them O) and are considering whether O strongly favors one hypothesis (H_2) over another (H_1). The Surprise Principle says that O strongly favors H_2 over H_1 if H_2 says that O is very probable while H_1 says that O is quite improbable. O would be unsurprising if H_2 were true, but O would be very surprising if H_1 were true.

Not only do we infer the existence of a watchmaker from the watch we found; we also can infer something about the watchmaker's characteristics. We can say that the designer must have been fairly intelligent to produce an object of such intricacy. Chimps are somewhat intelligent, but it is dubious that a chimp could have made the watch. Rather, what we naturally infer is that the watchmaker must have had an intelligence at least on the order of human intelligence, given the features of the watch we observe.

THE ANALOGY

So far in this argument, Paley is simply describing what common sense would say about the watch on the beach. Paley then suggests an analogy. Look around the living world. Notice that it is filled with organisms that are extremely intricate and well adapted to living in the environments they inhabit. In fact, organisms are far more complicated than watches. And as well suited as a watch is to the task of measuring time, organisms are even better suited to the tasks of surviving and reproducing.

How can we explain the fact that organisms are so amazingly intricate and well adapted? One possibility is the Random Hypothesis—that by a process akin to waves pounding on sand, orchids, crocodiles, and people came into existence. The other alternative is the Design Hypothesis—that an organism maker made the impressive pieces of machinery we call living things. Which explanation is more plausible? If the Random Hypothesis says that the existence of a watch is very improbable, then the Random Hypothesis also must say that the existence of these intricate and adapted organisms is very improbable. So if inferring the existence of a watchmaker is plausible in the first case, then inferring the existence of a designer of all life is plausible in the second.

Finally, we may ask how intelligent this maker of organisms must be, given the intricacy and fineness of adaptation that organisms exhibit. From what watches are like, we can infer that watchmakers must be pretty smart. By the same reasoning, we infer that the maker of organisms must be very, very intelligent—far more intelligent than human beings are. Paley's design argument concludes that the intricacy and adaptedness of organisms are best explained by postulating the existence of an *extremely* intelligent designer.

ABDUCTIONS OFTEN POSTULATE UNOBSERVED ENTITIES

There is a point that pertains to all of Aquinas's arguments that should be emphasized here. The design argument claims there is something we observe—the complexity and adaptedness of living things—that is best explained by the hypothesis that there is a God. The conclusion of the argument concerns the existence of something we have not directly observed. Although there may be defects in this argument, the fact that it reaches a conclusion about a being we have not observed isn't one of them. Recall from Chapter 3 that abductive arguments frequently have this characteristic. It would cripple science to limit theorizing to a description of what scientists have actually observed. So my view of Paley's argument is that it is an abductive argument:

Organisms are intricate and well suited to the tasks of survival and reproduction.

Hence, organisms were created by an intelligent designer.

I've drawn a double line here to indicate that the argument does not aim at being deductively valid.

To show this is a strong abductive argument, Paley argues that it is analogous to a second inference to the best explanation:

The watch is intricate and well suited to the task of measuring time.

Hence, the watch was created by an intelligent designer.

Paley claims that if you grant that the second abductive argument is convincing, you should grant that the first one is convincing as well.

HUME'S CRITICISMS OF THE DESIGN ARGUMENT

Hume's *Dialogues on Natural Religion* contain several criticisms of the design argument. Sometimes he is talking about global design arguments—ones that argue that the entire universe must be the product of intelligent design. At other times, Hume addresses local arguments—ones that focus on the adaptedness and intricacy of organisms.

I've claimed that design arguments are abductive. Hume paints a very different picture. He represents the arguments as being *inductive arguments* or *arguments from analogy*. This may not look like a very important difference, since all of these formulations involve a nondeductive inference. But you will see in what follows that two of Hume's criticisms of design arguments aren't very convincing if we think of the design argument as an inference to the best explanation.

IS THE DESIGN ARGUMENT A WEAK ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY?

In this section, I'll discuss a criticism of the argument from design that Hume develops in Part II of his *Dialogues* (see the paragraph beginning "What I chiefly scruple ...").

To see what Hume has in mind when he talks about arguments from analogy, consider the following example of an analogy argument:

Human beings circulate their blood.

—————
Dogs circulate their blood.

I've drawn a double line between the premise and the conclusion, again to indicate that the argument isn't deductively valid. In this argument, let's call human beings the *analog*s and dogs the *target*s. I say that dogs are the targets here because they are the items about which the argument aims to reach a conclusion. Hume suggests, with some plausibility, that such arguments are stronger or weaker depending on how similar the analogs are to the targets. To see what he means here, compare the above argument with the following one:

Human beings circulate their blood.

—————
Plants circulate their blood.

This argument is quite weak, because human beings and plants aren't very similar.

We can formulate Hume's point by saying that an analogy argument has the following logical form:

Object *A* has property *P*.

Object *A* and object *T* are similar to degree *n*.

n [—————
T has property *P*.

A is the analog and *T* is the target. The number *n* measures the degree of similarity between *A* and *T*. It goes from a minimum value of 0 (meaning that *A* and *T* aren't similar at all) to a maximum value of 1 (meaning that they share all their characteristics). This number also represents a probability—that is why "*n*" is next to the double line separating premises from conclusion. A high value of *n* means that *A* and *T* are very similar and that the premises make the conclusion very probable. This expresses Hume's idea that the more similar *A* and *T* are, the more probable it is that the target object *T* has the property found in the analog *A*.

Hume uses this idea about analogy arguments to criticize the design argument. He thinks the design argument has the following form:

Watches are the products of intelligent design.

n [—————
The universe is the product of intelligent design.

This is a very weak argument, Hume says, since the analog is really not very similar to the target. Watches resemble the universe as a whole in some ways, but fail to do so in a great many others. So *n* has a low value.

Here Hume is criticizing what I've called a global design argument—an argument that focuses on some large-scale feature of the entire universe. Hume's point, however, also applies to local design arguments—to arguments that focus on organisms and their characteristics:

Watches are the products of intelligent design.

n [—————
Organisms are the product of intelligent design.

Hume's criticism is that organisms are really not very similar to watches. Watches are made of metal, but organisms aren't. Kangaroos hop around, but watches don't. Organisms reproduce and obtain nutrition from their environment, but watches don't. And so on. Since analog and target are so dissimilar, the analogy argument is a very weak one; *n* is low here as well.

Hume's idea is that the strength or weakness of an analogy argument depends on the *overall similarity* of target and analog. You look at all the known characteristics of target and analog and try to say how similar they are overall. I grant that if you did this, you would conclude that watches and kangaroos aren't very similar.

My view, however, is that this doesn't undermine the design argument at all when that argument is taken to be abductive. It is entirely irrelevant whether watches and kangaroos both have fur, or whether both hop around, or whether both reproduce. The design argument focuses on *a single pair of features* of each of these and asks how it should be explained. A watch's intricacy, as well as its being well suited to measuring time, require that we think of it as the product of intelligent design. Paley's claim is that an organism's intricacy, as well as its being well suited to the tasks of survival and reproduction, ought to be explained in the same way. It doesn't matter that the one is made of metal while the other isn't. *Overall similarity* is irrelevant.

The fundamental idea of Paley's argument is that the Surprise Principle tells us that the Design Hypothesis is better supported than the Random Hypothesis, given the observations we have made about living things. This argument stands on its own. To use the Surprise Principle in this case, it doesn't matter whether organisms are similar to watches or to anything else. I conclude that Hume is mistaken to criticize the design argument as a weak argument from analogy.

IS THE DESIGN ARGUMENT A WEAK INDUCTION?

A second criticism that Hume levels at the design argument rests on thinking that the argument must be inductive if it is to make sense. (Here I have in mind the paragraph in Part II of the *Dialogues* that begins "And can you blame me ..."; see especially the passage that begins "When two species of objects ...")

Recall from Chapter 2 that inductive arguments involve observing a sample and extrapolating from it to some claim about one or more objects not in the sample. For example, suppose I call a large number of voters registered in a county and find that most of them are Democrats. This seems to license the inference that the next voter I call will probably be a Democrat. Hume observes, again with some plausibility, that the strength of an inductive inference is influenced by sample size. In particular, if my sample had included only five individuals, I would be on rather shaky ground if I used this as my basis for predicting what the next voter called would be like. My inference would be on even shakier ground if I ventured a guess about the next telephone call having never sampled even a single voter. A sample size of zero is just plain silly; an inductive argument can't be weaker than that.

Hume claims that if we are to have a reason for thinking that the universe we inhabit is the product of intelligent design, we must base this conclusion on induction. What would this involve? We would have to examine a large number of other universes and see that most or all of them were the result of intelligent design. If our sample size were sufficiently large, that would justify a conclusion about the universe we inhabit. But how big *is* our sample size? How many universes have we observed being made by an intelligent designer? The answer is—zero. The only universe we have ever experienced is the one we inhabit. We have not seen our universe being made by an intelligent designer, nor have we seen an intelligent designer make the organisms that exist in our universe. So no inductive argument can be constructed here.

My view is that this is true, but irrelevant. Small sample size does weaken an inductive argument. However, the design argument isn't an inductive argument. Hume assumed that the only sorts of inferences worth taking seriously are inductive and deductive. I think this is a mistake. There is abduction as well. Mendel didn't have to observe that lots of different organisms have genes before he could conclude that his pea plants have genes. Mendel never saw a single gene, but this didn't prevent him from inferring their existence. His inference was abductive, not inductive.

I've reviewed two of Hume's criticisms of the design argument. They don't work. Of course, this doesn't mean that the argument has no flaws, only that we have yet to uncover one. The design argument that Paley formulated considers two competing hypotheses—the hypothesis of intelligent design and the hypothesis of random physical processes. In the mid-nineteenth century, a new hypothesis was formulated that we now need to consider as a third alternative—this is Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. In the next chapter, I'll describe what this hypothesis asserts and discuss how it compares with the hypothesis of intelligent design.

Review Questions

1. What does it mean to say that the design argument is an abductive argument?
2. What is the difference between a global design argument and a local design argument?
3. How does Paley's argument about the watch use the Surprise Principle?

4. Hume formulated a principle that states how the strength of an analogy argument may be measured. What is it?
5. What two criticisms did Hume make of the design argument? Are these good criticisms if the argument is understood to be abductive in character?

Problems for Further Thought

1. It might be suggested that one difference between Paley's argument about the watch and his argument about organisms is that we have seen watchmakers, but have never directly observed God. Does this point of difference undermine the force of Paley's design argument?
2. I mentioned in passing that modern science no longer takes seriously the idea that *all* things are goal-directed systems. Consider the following pair of propositions. Can you think of a reason that the first of them might be true, whereas the second might be rejected?

The function of the heart is to pump blood.

The function of rain is to provide farm crops with water.

What does it mean to attribute a "function" to something?

3. In addition to the two criticisms that Hume makes of the design argument that are described in this chapter, Hume presents a third. He says that even if the design argument succeeds in showing that a designer made the universe (or the organisms in it), the argument does not succeed in establishing what characteristics that designer has. For this reason, the argument does not show that God exists. Is Hume's claim correct? How seriously does this undermine the design argument?

CHAPTER 6

Evolution and Creationism


Aquinas and Paley maintained that the intricacy and adaptedness of organisms can be explained only by viewing them as the product of intelligent design, but they were not able to consider an alternative theory that Charles Darwin (1809–1882) put on the table in 1859 when he published his book *The Origin of Species*. Modern-day creationists do consider what their predecessors could not; they reject Darwin's theory and maintain that the old design argument is still correct. My goal in this chapter is to give a sample of the kinds of arguments that one needs to consider in thinking

about the evolution versus creation debate. As I promised at the end of Chapter 3, I'll here introduce a new principle that is important to abductive inference, which will supplement the Surprise Principle and the Only Game in Town Fallacy. Unfortunately, I won't have time to provide a full treatment of the philosophical issues, and there are lots of biological details that are important here that I won't be able to discuss.

CREATIONISM

Creationists (sometimes calling themselves "scientific creationists" or "intelligent design theorists") are present-day defenders of the design argument. Although they agree among themselves that intelligent design is needed to explain some features of the living world, they disagree with each other about various points of detail. Some hold that the earth is young (around 10,000 years old), whereas others concede that it is ancient—about 4.5 billion years old, according to current geology. Some creationists maintain that each species (or basic "kind" of organism) was separately created by an intelligent designer, whereas others concede that biologists are right when they assert, as Darwin did, that all life on earth traces back to a common ancestor.

To clarify what creationism asserts, let's consider three possible relationships that might obtain among God (*G*), mindless evolutionary processes (*E*), and the complex adaptations that organisms are observed to have (*O*):



Theistic evolutionism says that God set mindless evolutionary processes in motion; these processes, once underway, suffice to explain the complex adaptations we observe organisms to have. Atheistic evolutionism denies that there is a God, but otherwise agrees with theistic evolutionism that mindless evolutionary processes are responsible for complex adaptations. Creationism disagrees with both theistic evolutionism and atheistic evolutionism. Creationism maintains that mindless evolutionary processes are incapable of giving rise to complex adaptations and that God directly intervenes in nature to bring these about. Creationism does not deny that evolution is responsible for some of the features we observe in nature; creationists concede that quantitative changes in a feature found in a species might be due to natural selection (an example of this sort of change will be described below). However, the emergence of genuinely novel, complex adaptive features is, for creationists, another story entirely.

You can see from these three options that belief in evolutionary theory is not the same as atheism. In my opinion, current evolutionary theory is neutral on the question of whether there is a God. Evolutionary theory can be supplemented with a claim, either *pro* or *con*, concerning whether God exists. Evolutionary theory also is consistent with agnosticism, which is the view that we don't know whether there is a God.

Evolutionary theory, however, is not consistent with creationism. Evolutionary theory holds that mindless evolutionary processes (including the process of natural selection) are responsible for the complex adaptations we observe; creationism denies this.

SOME CREATIONIST ARGUMENTS

Some of the most frequently repeated creationist arguments contain mistakes and confusions. For example, some creationists have argued that evolutionary theory is on shaky ground because hypotheses about the distant past can't be proven with absolute certainty. They are right that evolutionary theory isn't absolutely certain, but then nothing in science is absolutely certain; recall the remarks in Chapter 3 about gambling. What one legitimately strives for in science is powerful evidence showing that one explanation is far more plausible than its competitors. Biologists now regard the hypotheses of evolution as about as certain as any hypothesis about the prehistoric past could be. Naturally, no scientist was on the scene some 3.8 billion years ago when life started to exist on Earth. However, it is nonetheless possible to have strong evidence about matters that one can't directly observe, as I hope my previous discussion of abduction has made clear.

Another example of an error that some creationists make is their discussion of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. They claim this law shows that it is impossible for order to arise from disorder by natural processes. Natural processes can lead an automobile to disintegrate into a junk heap, but creationists think the Second Law of Thermodynamics says that no natural process can cause a pile of junk to assemble itself into a functioning car. Here creationists are arguing that physics is inconsistent with the claim that life evolved from nonlife. What the Second Law actually says is that a *closed system* will (with high probability) move from states of greater order to states of lesser order. But if the system isn't closed, the law says nothing about what will happen. So if the Earth were a closed system, its overall level of disorder would have to increase. But, of course, the Earth is no such thing—energy from the sun is a constant input. If the universe as a whole as a closed system, then thermodynamics does entail that disorder will increase overall. But this overall trend doesn't prohibit "pockets" of order from arising and being maintained. The Second Law of Thermodynamics offers no basis for thinking that life couldn't have evolved from nonlife.

A full treatment of the evolution versus creationism debate would require me to describe the positive explanations that creationists have advanced. If you want to compare evolutionary theory and creationism, you can't just focus on whatever difficulties there may be in evolutionary ideas. You've also got to look carefully at what the alternative is. Doing this produces lots of difficulties for creationism. The reason is that creationists have either been woefully silent on the details of the explanation they want to defend, or they have produced detailed stories that can't withstand scientific scrutiny. For example, young earth creationists, as I mentioned, maintain that the earth is only a few thousand years old. This claim conflicts with a variety of very solid scientific findings, from geology and physics. It isn't just evolutionary theory that

you have to reject if you buy into this version of creationism, but a good deal of the rest of science as well.

As I also indicated, there are many different versions of creationism. Creationism is not a single theory, but a cluster of similar theories. In the present chapter, I won't attempt to cover all these versions, but will focus on a few of the options. First let's look at the ABCs of Darwinism.

DARWIN'S TWO-PART THEORY

Many of the main ideas that Darwin developed in *The Origin of Species* are still regarded by scientists as correct, but others have been refined or expanded. Still others have been junked entirely. Although evolutionary theory has developed a long way since Darwin's time, I'll take his basic ideas as a point of departure. Darwin's theory contains two main elements. First, there is the idea that all present-day life is related. The organisms we see didn't come into existence independently by separate creation. Rather, organisms are related to each other by a family tree. You and I are related. If we go back far enough in time, we'll find a human being who is an ancestor of both of us. The same is true of us and a chimp, though, of course, we must go back even further in time to reach a common ancestor. And so it is for any two present-day organisms. Life evolved from nonlife, and then descent with modification gave rise to the diversity we now observe.

Notice that this first hypothesis of Darwin's says nothing about *why* new characteristics arose in the course of evolution. If all life is related, why aren't all living things identical? The second part of Darwin's theory is the idea of natural selection. This hypothesis tries to explain why new characteristics appear and become common and why some old characteristics disappear. It is very important to keep these two elements in Darwin's theory separate. The idea that all present-day living things are related isn't at all controversial in modern science. The idea that natural selection is the principal cause of evolutionary change is *somewhat* controversial, although it is still by far the majority view among biologists. One reason it is important to keep these ideas separate is that some creationists have tried to score points by confusing them. Creationists sometimes suggest that the whole idea of evolution is something even biologists regard with great doubt and suspicion. However, the idea that all life is related isn't at all controversial. What is controversial, at least to some degree, are ideas about natural selection.

NATURAL SELECTION

Here's a simple example of how natural selection works. Imagine a population of zebras that all have the same top speed. They can't run faster than 38 mph. Now imagine that a novelty appears in the population. A mutation occurs—a change in the genes found in some zebra—that allows that newfangled zebra to run faster at 42 mph, say. Suppose running faster is advantageous, because a fast zebra is less likely

to be caught and eaten by a predator than a slow one is. Running fast enhances the organism's *fitness*—its ability to survive and reproduce. If running speed is passed on from parent to offspring, what will happen? What will occur (probably) is that the fast zebra will have more offspring than the average slow zebra. As a result, the percentage of fast zebras increases. In the next generation, fast zebras enjoy the same advantage, and so the characteristic of being fast will again increase in frequency. After a number of generations, we expect all the zebras to have this new characteristic. Initially, all the zebras ran at 38 mph. After the selection process runs its course, all run at 42 mph. So the process comes in two stages. First, a novel mutation occurs, creating the variation upon which natural selection operates. Then, natural selection goes to work changing the composition of the population:

<i>Start</i>	→	<i>Then</i>	→	<i>Finish</i>
100% run at 38 mph.		A novel mutant runs at 42 mph; the rest run at 38 mph.		100% run at 42 mph.

We may summarize how this process works by saying that natural selection occurs in a population of organisms when there is *inherited variation in fitness*. Let's analyze what this means. The organisms must *vary*; if all the organisms are the same, then there will be no variants to select among. What is more, the variations must be passed down from parents to offspring. This is the requirement of *inheritance*. Last, it must be true that the varying characteristics in a population affect an organism's *fitness*—its chance of surviving and reproducing. If these three conditions are met, the population will evolve. By this, I mean that the frequency of characteristics will change.

The idea of natural selection is really quite simple. What Darwin did was to show how this simple idea has many implications and applications. Merely stating this simple idea wouldn't have convinced anyone that natural selection is the right explanation of life's diversity. The power of the idea comes from the numerous detailed applications.

Notice that the introduction of novel characteristics into a population is a precondition for natural selection to occur. Darwin didn't have a very accurate picture of how novel traits arise. He theorized about this, but didn't come up with anything of lasting importance. Rather, it was later in the nineteenth century that Mendel started to fill in this detail. Genetic mutations, we now understand, are the source of the variation on which natural selection depends. One central idea that Darwin had about mutation, which twentieth-century genetics has vindicated, is that mutations do not occur because they would be useful to the organism; this is what biologists mean when they say that mutations occur "at random."

Creationists sometimes say that the process of evolution by natural selection is like a tornado blowing through a junkyard. The latter process cannot sweep together the scraps of metal laying around on the ground and assemble them into a functioning automobile. From this, creationists conclude that the former process is likewise incapable of creating novel adaptations. This analogy is fundamentally misleading. The tornado is a totally random process, like the spinning of a huge roulette wheel.

However, evolution by natural selection has two parts; mutations appear randomly, but then it is not a random matter which mutations increase in frequency and which decline. Selection is nonrandom. A better analogy than the tornado in the junkyard is one that Darwin proposed in his 1873 book *The Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication*:

Let an architect be compelled to build an edifice with uncut stones, fallen from a precipice. The shape of each fragment may be called accidental; yet the shape of each has been determined by the force of gravity, the nature of the rock, and the slope of the precipice,—events and circumstances all of which depend on natural laws; but there is no relation between these laws and the purpose for which each fragment is used by the builder. In the same manner the variations of each creature are determined by fixed and immutable laws; but these bear no relation to the living structure which is slowly built up through the power of natural selection, whether this be natural or artificial selection. (Darwin 1876, p. 236)

Notice that the little story I've told about zebra running speed describes a rather modest change that occurs *within* an existing species. Yet Darwin's 1859 book was called *The Origin of Species*. How does change within a species help explain the coming into existence of new species?

SPECIATION

Darwin's hypothesis was that small changes in a population (like the one I just described) add up. Given enough little changes, the organisms will become very different. Modern evolutionists usually tell a story like the following one. Think of a single population of zebras. Imagine that a small number of zebras are separated from the rest of the population for some reason; maybe they wander off or a river changes course and splits the old population in two. If the resulting populations live in different environments, selection will lead them to become increasingly different. Characteristics that are advantageous in one population will not be advantageous in the other. After a long time, the populations will have diverged. They will have become so different from each other that individuals from the one can't breed with individuals from the other. Because of this, they will be two species, not two populations belonging to the same species.

Pretty much everybody in Darwin's day, including those who thought that God created each species separately, would have agreed that the little story about zebras evolving a greater speed could be true. The real resistance to Darwin's theory focused on his thesis that the mechanism responsible for small-scale changes *within* species also gives rise to large-scale changes, namely, to the origin of *new* species. This was a daring hypothesis, but it now is the mainstream view in evolutionary theory. Even so, biologists continue to debate the importance that natural selection has had in the evolutionary process. Modern evolutionary theory describes other possible causes of

evolutionary change. Which traits were due to natural selection and which were due to other evolutionary processes? There are a number of still unanswered questions in evolutionary biology about natural selection. Even biologists who hold that natural selection is the major cause of evolution are sometimes puzzled about how it applies in particular cases. For example, it is still rather unclear why sexual reproduction evolved. Some creatures reproduce sexually, others asexually. Why is this? Although there are open questions pertaining to natural selection, I want to emphasize that it isn't at all controversial that human beings share common ancestors with chimps. Don't confuse the idea of common ancestry with the idea of natural selection; these are separate elements in Darwin's theory.

THE TREE OF LIFE

I turn now to this uncontroversial idea. Why do biologists think it is so clear that living things are related to each other—that there is a family tree of life on earth just like there is a family tree of your family? Two kinds of evidence have seemed persuasive. I won't give the details here; rather, I want to describe the *kinds* of arguments biologists deploy. As a philosopher, I'm more interested that you grasp the logic of the arguments; for the biological details, you should consult a biology book.

To illustrate how one line of argument works, consider this simple problem. Suppose I assign a philosophy class the job of writing an essay on the meaning of life. As I read through the papers, I notice that two students have handed in papers that are word-for-word identical. How should I explain this striking similarity? One possibility, of course, is that the students worked independently and by coincidence arrived at exactly the same result. The independent origin of the two papers isn't impossible. But I would regard this hypothesis as extremely implausible. Far more convincing is the idea that one student copied from the other or that each of them copied from a common source—a paper downloaded from the Internet, perhaps. This hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of the observed similarity of the two papers.


THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COMMON CAUSE

The plagiarism example illustrates an idea that the philosopher Hans Reichenbach (in *The Direction of Time*, University of California Press, 1956) called the *Principle of the Common Cause*. Let's analyze the example more carefully to understand the rationale of the principle.

Why, in the case just described, is it more plausible that the students copied from a common source than that they wrote their papers independently? Consider how probable the matching of the two papers is, according to each of the two hypotheses. If the two students copied from a common source, then it is rather probable that the papers should closely resemble each other. If, however, the students worked independently, then it is enormously improbable that the two papers should be so

similar. Here we have an application of the Surprise Principle described in Chapter 3: If one hypothesis says that the observations are very probable whereas the other hypothesis says that the observations are very improbable, then the observations strongly favor the first hypothesis over the second. The Principle of the Common Cause makes sense because it is a consequence of the Surprise Principle.

The example just described involves hypotheses that describe mental activity—when students plagiarize they use their minds, and the same is true when they write papers independently. However, it is important to see that the Principle of the Common Cause also makes excellent sense when the hypotheses considered do not describe mental processes. Here's an example: I have a barometer at my house. I notice that when it says "low," there usually is a storm the next day; and when it says "high," there usually is no storm the next day. The barometer reading on one day and the weather on the next are *correlated*. It may be that this correlation is just a coincidence; perhaps the two events are entirely independent. However, a far more plausible hypothesis is that the reading on one day and the weather on the next trace back to a common cause—namely, the weather at the time the reading is taken:



The common cause hypothesis is more plausible because it leads you to expect the correlation of the two observed effects. The separate cause hypothesis is less plausible because it says that the observed correlation is a very improbable coincidence. Notice that the hypotheses in this example do not describe the mental activities of agents.

ARBITRARY SIMILARITIES AMONG ORGANISMS

I'll now apply this principle to the evolutionary idea of common ancestry. One reason biologists think all life is related is that all organisms (with some minor exceptions) use the same genetic code. To understand what this means, think of the genes in your body as a set of instructions for constructing more complex biological items—amino acids and then proteins. The total sequence of genes in your body and the sequence in a frog's are different. The striking fact, however, is that the gene that codes for a given amino acid in a frog codes for that very same amino acid in people. As far as we now know, there is no reason why the genes that code for a given amino acid had to code for that acid rather than some other. The code is arbitrary; there is no functional reason why it has to be the way it is. (Don't be misled by my talk of codes here. This word may suggest intelligent design, but this isn't what biologists mean. Genes *cause* amino acids to form; for present purposes, this is a perfectly satisfactory way to understand what it means for genes to "code for" this or that amino acid.)

How are we to explain the detailed similarity among the genetic codes that different species use? If the species arose independently of each other, we would expect them to use different genetic codes. But if those species all trace back to a common ancestor, it is to be expected that they will share the same genetic code. The Principle of the Common Cause underlies the belief that evolutionary biologists have that all living things on earth have common ancestors.

USEFUL SIMILARITIES AMONG ORGANISMS

The reason a shared genetic code is evidence of common ancestry is that the code is arbitrary. There are lots of possible codes that would work. If there were only a single functional code, the fact that different species use this one code would not be evidence of common ancestry. Consider, for example the fact that sharks and dolphins both have a streamlined body shape. Both are shaped like torpedoes. Is this strong evidence that they have a common ancestor? I would say not. There is an obvious functional reason why large predators that spend their lives swimming through water should be shaped like this. If there is life in other galaxies that includes large aquatic predators, we would probably expect it to have this sort of shape. Even if life on earth and life on other galaxies are not descended from common ancestors, there are *some* similarities we still would expect to find. I conclude that the streamlined shape of dolphins and sharks isn't strong evidence that they evolved from a common ancestor. The Surprise Principle explains why some similarities, but not others, are evidence for the hypothesis that there is a tree of life uniting all organisms on earth.

The genetic code is one just one example of a similarity that can't be explained by its usefulness to the organism. There are lots of others. Consider the fact that human beings have tail bones, that we have appendices, and that human fetuses have gill slits. None of these features is useful. In fact, the appendix is worse than useless, since burst appendices kill many people. Biologists interpret these features as evidence that we share common ancestors with nonhuman organism. This and lots of other evidence points to the conclusion that we share common ancestors with monkeys, with other mammals, with fish, and with all other living things. In drawing this conclusion, biologists are using the Surprise Principle and the Principle of the Common Cause.

IRREDUCIBLE COMPLEXITY

Although creationists have usually rejected the Darwinian hypothesis of common ancestry, not all have done so. What creationists universally reject is the thesis that natural selection is the correct explanation of the complex adaptations we observe in nature. Modern-day creationists are usually willing to grant that selection can explain small modifications in existing species, as in the earlier example about zebra running speed. But how can the gradual accumulation of modifications explain a feature like the vertebrate eye? This is the key objection that Michael Behe develops in

Humans from Nonhumans, Life from Nonlife

When people hear about the idea of evolution, there are two parts of the theory that sometimes strike them as puzzling. First, there is the idea that human beings are descended from apelike ancestors. Second, there is the idea that life evolved from nonliving materials.

Scientists believe the first of these statements because there are so many striking similarities between apes and human beings. This isn't to deny that there are differences. However, the similarities (e.g., the fact that both have tail bones) would be expected if humans and apes have a common ancestor, but would be quite surprising if they came into existence independently.

There is a big difference between having evidence humans are descended from apelike ancestors and *having an explanation of precisely why this happened*. The evidence for a common ancestor is pretty overwhelming, but the details of why evolution proceeded in just the way it did are less certain. Students of human evolution continue to investigate why our species evolved as it did. In contrast, the claim that we did evolve isn't a matter of scientific debate.

What about the second idea—that life arose from nonlife? Why not maintain that God created the first living thing and then let evolution by natural selection produce the diversity we now observe? Notice that this is a very different idea from what creationists maintain. They hold that each species (or “basic kind” of organism) is the result of separate creation by God. They deny that present-day species are united by common descent from earlier life forms.

One main sort of evidence for thinking that life evolved from nonlife on Earth about 4 billion years ago comes from laboratory experiments. Scientists have created laboratory conditions that resemble the ones they believe were present shortly after the Earth came into existence about 4.5 billion years ago. They find that the nonliving ingredients present then can enter into chemical reactions, the products of which are simple organic materials. For example, it is possible to run electricity (lightning) through a “soup” of inorganic molecules and produce amino acids. Why is this significant? Amino acids are an essential stage in the process whereby genes construct an organism. Similar experiments have generated a variety of promising results. This subject in biology—*prebiotic evolution*—is very much open and incomplete. No one has yet been able to get inorganic materials to produce DNA, but the promising successes to date suggest that further work will further illuminate how life arose from nonlife.

Laboratory experiments don't aim to create a multicellular organism from inorganic materials. No one wants to make a chicken out of carbon, ammonia, and water. Evolution by natural selection proceeds by the accumulation of very small changes. So the transition from nonlife to life must involve the creation of a rather simple self-replicating molecule. Chickens came much later.

A self-replicating molecule is a molecule that makes copies of itself. A molecule of this sort is able to reproduce. With accurate replication, the offspring of a molecule will resemble its parent. Once a simple self-replicating molecule is in place, evolution by natural selection can begin. It may sound strange to describe a simple self-replicating molecule as being “alive.” Such a molecule will do few of the things that a chicken does. But from the biological point of view, reproduction and heredity (that is, similarity between parents and offspring) are fundamental properties.

his 1966 book *Darwin's Black Box* when he introduces the concept of *irreducible complexity*. Behe defines an irreducibly complex system as one in which the whole system has a function, the system is made of many parts, and the system would not be able to perform its function if any of the parts were removed. Behe's idea is that the Darwinian process of natural selection involves adding one small part to another, with

each modification improving the fitness of the organism. But what good is 1% of an eye? Creationists, Behe included, think that the answer is obvious—no good at all—and that this shows that evolutionary theory can't explain complex adaptations.

Biologists sometimes respond to this creationist claim by arguing that gradual modification *can* explain structures like the eye. A piece of light sensitive skin allows the organism to tell the difference between light and dark, and this is advantageous. Then, if this skin is shaped into a cup, the organism can not only tell whether it is light or dark, but can also tell from what direction the light is coming, and this provides a further advantage. Maybe it is not so obvious that the eye can't evolve one small step at the time. However, there is another, more fundamental, problem with Behe's argument. What we call “the parts” of a system may or may not correspond to the historical sequence of accumulating details. Consider the horse and its four legs. A horse with zero, one, or two legs cannot walk or run; suppose the same is true for a horse with three. In contrast, a horse with four legs can walk and run, and it thereby gains a fitness advantage. So far so good—the four-legged arrangement satisfies the definition of irreducible complexity. The mistake comes from thinking that horses (or their ancestors) had to evolve their four legs one leg at a time. In fact it's a mistake to think that a separate set of genes controls the development of each leg; rather, there is a single set that controls the development of appendages. A division of a system into parts that entails that the system is irreducibly complex may or may not correspond to the historical sequence of events through which the lineage passed. This point is obvious with respect to the horse's four legs, but needs to be borne in mind when other, less familiar, organic features are considered. What we call the “parts” of the eye may not correspond to the sequence of events that occurred in the eye's evolution.

IS CREATIONISM TESTABLE?

So far I have outlined what Darwin's theory of evolution amounts to, the kind of evidence that biologists take seriously for the claim of common ancestry, and some objections that creationists make to this theory. The question I now want to consider concerns the theory that creationists themselves present. What is it? What predictions does it make? What evidence is there for the theory they present?

Here we need to consider some of the different versions that creationism might take. To get started, let's consider:

H_1 : A superintelligent designer fashioned all the complex adaptations we observe organisms to have so that organisms would be perfectly adapted to their environment.

This hypothesis is disconfirmed by what we observe. Organisms often have highly imperfect adaptations. The eye that human beings use has a blindspot, though the eye of the octopus does not. And many spiders have eyes with built-in sunglasses, though human beings do not. Our eye is imperfect and so are lots of features that

we and other organisms possess. Can we repair this defect in H_1 ? One way to do so is to make the hypothesis of intelligent design more modest in what it says:

H_2 : An intelligent designer fashioned all the complex adaptations we observe organisms to have.

The problem with H_2 is not that it makes false predictions, but that it makes none at all. H_2 is consistent with what we observe, no matter what our observations turn out to be. Features that are useful are consistent, as well as features that are neutral and features that are harmful. One of the features that scientists expect scientific theories to have is that they be testable, by which they mean that theories should make predictions that can be checked against observations. H_2 , it appears, is not testable. This defect can also be remedied. Consider, for example, a third version of creationism:

H_3 : Organisms did not evolve. Rather, God created each species separately and endowed them with the very characteristics they would have had if they had evolved by natural selection.

H_3 is a wild card; it makes the same predictions that evolutionary theory makes. If so, what reason can there be to choose between these two theories?

PREDICTIVE EQUIVALENCE

Evolutionary theory and H_3 are *predictively equivalent*. If evolutionary theory predicts that life will have a particular feature, so does H_3 . Although imperfect adaptations disconfirm H_1 , they are perfectly consistent with H_3 . Does this mean that evolutionary theory is not well supported? I would say not. Consider the following pair of hypotheses:

J_1 : You are now looking at a printed page.

J_2 : You are now looking at a salami.

You have excellent evidence that J_1 is true and that J_2 is false. J_1 predicts that you are having particular sensory experiences; if J_1 is true, you should be having certain visual, tactile, and gustatory sensations (please take a bite of this page). J_2 makes different predictions about these matters. The sensory experiences you now are having strongly favor J_1 over J_2 . Now, however, let's introduce a wild card. What evidence do you have that J_1 as opposed to J_3 is true:

J_3 : There is no printed page in front of you, but someone is now systematically misleading you into thinking that there is a printed page in front of you.

J_1 and J_3 are predictively equivalent. The experiences you now are having tell you that J_1 is more plausible than J_2 , but they don't strongly favor J_1 over J_3 . In the section of this book that focuses on Descartes's *Meditations* (Chapter 13), the problem of choosing between J_1 and J_3 will be examined in detail. For now, what I want you to see is this: When you ask whether some hypothesis is strongly supported by the evidence, you must ask yourself what the alternatives are against which the hypothesis is to be compared. If you compare J_1 with J_2 , you'll conclude that J_1 is extremely well supported. However, the problem takes on a different character if you compare J_1 with J_3 . The point applies to the competition between evolutionary theory and creationism. When you compare evolutionary theory with creationism, everything depends on which version of creationism you consider. Some versions make false predictions, some make no predictions, and some "piggy-back" on evolutionary theory, relying on that theory's ability to make predictions and then using those predictions.

PREDICTION VERSUS ACCOMMODATION

Here a fourth version of creationism raises interesting questions. Suppose we examine the human eye in detail and observe that it has a set of features that we'll call F. We then can construct the following version of creationism:

H_4 : An intelligent designer made the human eye and gave it the set of features F.

Does H_4 make predictions? Well, it entails what we should observe. In fact, no theory can do a better job than H_4 does of fitting what we observe, since H_4 hits the nail precisely on the head. The problem is that H_4 merely accommodates the observations; it does not provide novel predictions. It is easy—too easy—to construct hypotheses such as H_4 . Whenever you observe that O is true, you just construct the hypothesis that "an intelligent designer wanted O to be true and had the means to bring this about." If such hypotheses were satisfactory, there would be no need to do real science; we could shut down all of the costly research now underway and just invoke this tidy formula.

This suggests that we should supplement the two rules for abduction presented in Chapter 3. In addition to the Surprise Principle and the Only Game in Town Fallacy, we should require that a good theory make predictions that were not used in the construction of that theory. This is the requirement that theories shouldn't merely accommodate what we observe after the fact; in addition, they should make some predictions that are novel.

DOES EVOLUTIONARY THEORY MAKE NOVEL PREDICTIONS?

What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If we demand that creationism make novel predictions, we should demand that evolutionary theory do the same. By prediction, I do not restrict myself to saying what will happen in the future. A prediction

can involve observations that have not yet been made that reflect events that took place in the past. For example, the part of evolutionary theory that says that organisms possess common ancestors predicts that we should find intermediate fossil forms. Biology says that whales and cows have a common ancestor, so there should be fossils that have characteristics that are “in between.” And if birds and dinosaurs have a common ancestor, there should be fossils that are intermediate here as well. Darwin worried about “the incompleteness of the fossil record,” but there have been numerous fossil finds that fulfill the predictions of the hypothesis of common ancestry.

What about the other part of Darwin’s theory, the hypothesis of natural selection? What does it predict? Here it is important to realize that there are many detailed theories in evolutionary theory that predict which traits will be favored by natural selection in which circumstances. For example, in human beings, slightly more boys than girls are born. In other species, there is extreme male bias, or a female bias, in the sex ratio at birth. Evolutionary theory provides theories that predict when a species should evolve one sex ratio and when it should evolve another. Another example concerns the nature of infectious disease. Suppose you are infected with a disease that is spread through the air; if you get sick, you will take to your bed and you will spread the disease less frequently. Compare this to a disease like diarrhea that is spread through feces. Even if you take to your bed, your feces will be taken from your room and sent into the environment, just as if you were well. Now think about these two patterns from the point of view of the organism that causes the disease. In the case of an airborne disease, selection favors infections that are mild over ones that are severe; in the case of a waterborne disease, selection favors just the opposite pattern. The *vector* of the disease—the details concerning how the disease is spread from infected to uninfected individuals—allows biologists to predict what traits the disease should evolve. These evolutionary ideas have recently been important in biological thinking about AIDS-HIV; see Paul Ewald’s *The Evolution of Infectious Disease*, Oxford University Press, 1993, for discussion.

When I say that evolutionary theory makes predictions, I do not mean that it now is in a position to predict the whole detailed future of the planet’s biosphere, nor that every detail of the past can be predicted either. There are many open questions in evolutionary, as in any science. However, the theory has made impressive strides since 1859. The same is not true of creationism. Paley compared the random hypothesis with the hypothesis of intelligent design and argued that the latter was better supported; Behe compares evolutionary theory to the hypothesis of intelligent design and draws the same conclusion. In the two hundred years between these two publications, no theory worthy of the name has been developed.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Creationism comes in many forms. Some of them make very definite predictions about what we observe. The version that says that God made organisms so that they are perfectly adapted to their environments makes predictions that do not accord with

what we observe. Young earth creationism, which says that the earth is ten thousand years old, also makes predictions that conflict with what scientists observe. A third version of creationism says that God made organisms to look exactly as they would if they had evolved by the mindless process of natural selection; this makes the same predictions that evolutionary theory makes, and so our observations do not allow us to discriminate between evolutionary theory and this “mimicking” or “piggy-backing” version of creationism. Finally, the bare, minimalistic version of creationism that says that God had some (unspecified) impact on the traits of living things is, I suggest, untestable. We have not found a version of creationism that makes definite predictions about what we observe *and* that is better supported by the observations than evolutionary theory is. What is wanted here is not just a version of creationism that can accommodate the observations after we have made them, but one that tells us what we will observe before we make those observations. Is there a version of creationism that can do this?

Review Questions

1. What are the two main elements of Darwin’s theory?
2. Describe what the Principle of the Common Cause says. How is this principle related to the Surprise Principle? How is it used by biologists to decide whether different species have a common ancestor?
3. The geneticist François Jacob said (in “Evolution and Tinkering,” *Science*, Vol. 196, 1977, pp. 1161–1166) that “natural selection does not work as an engineer works. It works like a tinkerer—a tinkerer who does not know exactly what he is going to produce but uses whatever he finds around him.” What does Jacob mean here? How is this point relevant to evaluating whether the hypothesis of evolution or the hypothesis of intelligent design is a more plausible explanation of the characteristics of living things?
4. What does it mean to say that two theories are predictively equivalent? Can the design hypothesis be formulated so that the existence of imperfect adaptations isn’t evidence against it?

Problems for Further Thought

1. Louis Pasteur (1822–1895) developed scientific evidence against the hypothesis of “spontaneous generation.” For example, he argued that maggots developing on rotten meat aren’t the result of life springing spontaneously from nonliving materials; the maggots were hatched from eggs laid there by their parents. Does Pasteur’s discovery mean life couldn’t have evolved from nonliving materials?
2. Suppose you are a crew member on the starship *Enterprise*, bound for a new planet. You know there is intelligent life there; the question you want to answer

is whether these life forms have ever had any contact with Earth. Which sorts of observations would be relevant and which irrelevant to this question? Defend your interpretation. How does the Principle of the Common Cause apply to this problem?

3. Does Paley interpret the watch in a way that resembles what Behe means by irreducible complexity?

CHAPTER 7

Can Science Explain Everything?

In the previous chapter, we failed to identify a version of the design hypothesis that not only makes predictions, but also makes *novel* predictions, about the features we should observe in living things. It is a further question whether there are versions of creationism that do better than the versions I described. If there are not, then creationism should be discarded as an explanation of the characteristics that organisms possess. But this result would not show that the design hypothesis has no role to play at all. Perhaps there are other features of the universe, distinct from the ones discussed in biology, that we should explain by postulating the existence of an intelligent designer.

Here is another way to pose this problem: A *naturalistic* explanation seeks to explain features of the world by describing the processes in nature that produced them. A *super* naturalistic explanation, on the other hand, attempts to explain features of the world by describing the supernatural processes (the processes that occur outside of nature) that produced them. Is there reason to think that every feature of the world has a naturalistic explanation? If so, the hypothesis of a supernatural God isn't needed to explain anything.

The question I want to explore in this chapter is this: Should we expect that science will sooner or later explain everything that's true about the world we inhabit? That is, will science sooner or later be able to explain everything and do this without needing to postulate the existence of a supernatural God?

SCIENTIFIC IGNORANCE

It is easy to find facts about the world that science can't explain now. Every scientific discipline has its open questions. These are the things that keep present-day scientists busy. Scientists don't spend their time repeating to each other things everybody already knows; rather, they devote their energies to trying to puzzle out answers to heretofore unanswered questions.

Because there are plenty of facts about the world that science can't now explain, it is easy to construct a particular kind of abductive argument for the existence of God.

"But How Do You Explain God?"

Sometimes people object to the suggestion that the existence of God is the explanation of a fact by asking, "But how do you explain the existence of God?" The implications behind this question is that it isn't plausible to say that God explains something unless you are able to explain why God exists.

This criticism of abductive arguments for the existence of God isn't a good one. Mendel was right to think that the existence of genes explains something. However, Mendel had no idea how to explain the fact that genes exist. Here are two more examples that exhibit the same pattern. For hundreds of years before Newton's time, mariners had good evidence that the tides are correlated with the phases of the Moon, even though they had no very plausible explanation for why this should be so. As noted in the previous chapter, evolutionists have excellent evidence that human beings are descended from apelike ancestors, even though the explanation of this evolutionary event is still somewhat unclear. My conclusion is that if abductive arguments for the existence of God are defective, this isn't because no one knows how to explain why God exists.

I mentioned in the previous chapter that evolutionary theory is currently unable to explain why some species reproduce sexually while others don't. Consider the following theological explanation for this puzzling fact: There is a God, and God decided to make organisms reproduce in precisely the way they do. Whereas evolutionists can't (now) explain patterns of reproduction, a theologian can do this just by saying "it was God's will." I doubt that any scientist would argue that patterns of reproduction will *never* be explained scientifically. To be sure, evolutionists cannot *now* explain certain facts about sex. But science isn't over yet; it is reasonable to suspect that this example of scientific ignorance is only temporary.

THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN FALLACY

What should we say *now*? Apparently, we now have two choices: We can accept the theological explanation sketched above, or we can admit that we have no explanation at all for why some species, but not others, reproduce sexually. I think it is clear that we aren't obliged to accept the theological explanation. To think we are required to accept the theological explanation just because it is the only one on the table is to commit the Only Game in Town Fallacy.

Recall the anecdote from Chapter 3. If you and I are sitting in a cabin and hear noises in the attic, it is easy to formulate an explanation of those noises. I suggest the noises are due to gremlins bowling. This hypothesis has the property that if it were true, it would explain why we heard the noises. But this fact about the gremlin hypothesis doesn't mean that the hypothesis is plausible.

Instead of accepting a theological explanation of why organisms reproduce as they do, we should consider the option of simply admitting that we at present don't understand why this is so. If my prediction about the future of evolutionary theory is correct, we eventually will have a satisfactory scientific explanation. We just have to be patient.

I now want to consider a very different kind of scientific ignorance. Suppose there are facts about the world that science *in principle* can't explain. It isn't a temporary gap, but a permanent one, that I now want to consider. If there are such facts, then the choice won't be between a theological explanation and a naturalistic explanation that science will eventually produce; the choice will be between a theological explanation and no explanation at all—not now nor in the future.

THE TWO QUESTIONS

There are two questions I want to consider: (1) Are there any facts about the world that science is inherently incapable of explaining? (2) If there are, can we plausibly argue that the best explanation of why those facts are true is that God exists? To answer the first of these questions, I'll sketch a picture of how scientific explanation works. I then will argue that this view of scientific explanation implies that there are certain facts about the world that science can't ever explain. It isn't just that scientists haven't worked out the explanation *yet*; the point is that the nature of scientific explanation precludes their ever doing so.

WHAT IS A SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION?

There are two kinds of things science aims to explain. It aims to explain particular *events*, and it aims to explain *generalizations*. An example of the first type of problem would be the astronomer's question, "Why did the solar system come into existence?" An example of the second type would be the chemist's question, "Why does it take two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen for hydrogen and oxygen to combine to form a molecule of water?"

Don't confuse these two explanatory projects. Generalizations are true or false. Events aren't true or false; they happen or fail to happen. An event happens at a certain place and time. True generalizations, however, describe what is true of *all* places and times. I want to focus here on what scientists do when they explain *events*.

My thesis is that science explains an event by describing its causes. I'll assume further (although this isn't strictly necessary for what I want to conclude) that a cause has to precede its effects. So the causal explanation of an event E_1 that happens now is provided by citing one or more events in the past and showing how those events produced E_1 . Suppose we show that E_1 was caused by E_2 . We then might be interested in explaining why E_2 occurred. This might lead us to describe a still earlier event, E_3 , and so on. This project leads us to describe causal chains that trace back into the past. You'll recall that Aquinas (Chapter 4) believed causal chains extending back into the past can have only a finite number of links. I make no assumption about this.

So far I've described two relationships that can obtain between events: (1) some events precede others in time, and (2) some events cause others. There is a third relationship. Some events are *parts* of other events. Consider the relationship between the storming of the Bastille and the French Revolution. The storming of the Bastille


marked the beginning of the French Revolution. Both of these are events; the first is *part* of the second.

I want to focus on what science does when it tries to explain a spatiotemporal event. By "spatiotemporal," I simply mean that the event in question happened at some place and at some time. Of course, lots of events are "spread out." They don't occur in an instant, but take some length of time to occur. And they take place in a volume of space, not at a single spatial point. For example, the French Revolution lasted about 10 years, and it took place in France.

A THESIS ABOUT EXPLANATION

My thesis is this: For science to be able to say why a spatiotemporal event E occurred, there must be events in space and time that aren't included in E . I assume that no event explains itself. So if science is to explain E , there must be some event outside of E (but still inside of space and time) that can be cited as the explanation.

It follows from this thesis that answerable questions about why this or that spatiotemporal event occurred must focus on events that are *part* of what happens in the history of the spatiotemporal universe. Such questions can't be answered if they ask why the *whole history* of the spatiotemporal universe was as it was. Consider an exhaustive description of the past, present, and future of what happens in space and time:



E_1 is explicable, because there is something besides E_1 in the world that can be cited to do the explaining. If E_1 is part of some bigger event (the way the storming of the Bastille is part of the French Revolution), then that more inclusive event will be explicable only if there is something outside of it that we can cite by way of explanation. Such answerable questions about spatiotemporal events I'll call *local why-questions*. They focus on part of what has happened in the world's history. In contrast to them are *global why-questions*—questions that ask for an explanation of the totality of what has happened in the whole universe's history. I claim science can't answer global why-questions.

WHY IS THERE SOMETHING RATHER THAN NOTHING?

Here's an example of a global why-question: *Why is there something rather than nothing?* This question doesn't ask why there is something *now*. That, of course, is a local question, which can be answered by saying that the universe was nonempty in the past, and then perhaps citing a conservation law (as Aquinas did—see Chapter 4) that says that if the world is nonempty at one time, it will be nonempty forever after. What I have in mind here is the question of why the universe *ever* contained anything. That is, why wasn't the universe entirely devoid of material objects throughout its history?

The spatiotemporal universe is the totality of everything that was, is, or will be, anywhere. There is nothing impossible about a universe that contains no material objects. Obviously the actual world isn't this way. The actual world (the one we inhabit) corresponds to one total history. An empty universe corresponds to a different total history. Both of these totalities are possible, but only one is actual. The question of why there is something rather than nothing asks why the first of these possible worlds, rather than the second, is actual. My claim is that science can't answer this question.

CAN PHYSICS EXPLAIN THE ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE?

Don't be misled by the fact that physicists talk about explaining the "origin of the universe." This makes it sound like they are explaining why the universe is nonempty. My view is that they are doing no such thing. Rather they are addressing a different question. The Big Bang Theory doesn't show why the universe, in my sense of the word, came into existence. The universe, according to the way I am using the term, includes *everything* that there ever was, is, or will be. If the Big Bang produced what came after it, then the universe includes two stages: First, there was a Big Bang, and then there what happened next. The Big Bang doesn't explain why the whole universe exists; the Big Bang is *part* of the universe. The scientific question addressed by physicists is local, not global.

So the question "Why this totality, rather than that one?" isn't scientifically answerable, because it is global. Can a theological answer be provided? Let's imagine that God isn't a material object; he (or she or it) is outside the spatiotemporal totality I'm calling "the material universe." Can we explain why the material universe is nonempty by saying that God decided to make one totality actual rather than another?

LEIBNIZ: GOD CHOOSES WHICH POSSIBLE WORLD TO ACTUALIZE

The seventeenth-century philosopher/scientist Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) thought this form of explanation is plausible. He said that God considered the set of all possible worlds and decided to make one of them actual. He did this by finding which world is best. This is why we live in the best of all possible worlds. If you think the world we inhabit is morally imperfect, you may doubt Leibniz's story. In Chapter 11, I'll consider this issue when I take up the problem of evil. However, the point of importance here is that Leibniz had another kind of perfection in mind, in addition to moral perfection. Leibniz thought this is the best of all possible worlds in the sense that this world has the maximum diversity of phenomena and the maximum simplicity of laws. Scientific laws are simple, but the kinds of events that happen in our world are enormously rich. This joint property of our world is what makes it perfect in this nonmoral sense.

I won't discuss the details of Leibniz's theory. My point is that he proposed a theological explanation for why there is something rather than nothing in the world of space and time. This fact about the world, being global, can't be scientifically explained. The question I want to pose is this: If a fact can be explained by the hypothesis that there is a God, but can't be explained scientifically, is this a good enough reason to conclude there is a God?

CLARKE: GOD EXPLAINS WHY THE ACTUAL WORLD CONSISTS OF ONE TOTAL HISTORY RATHER THAN ANOTHER

Another anticipation of the argument for the existence of God we are considering is due to the British philosopher Samuel Clarke (1675–1729). Clarke thought he saw a way to improve an argument that Aquinas proposed. As noted in Chapter 4, Aquinas's second argument for the existence of God depends on the universe's being finitely old. Clarke's argument, presented in his 1705 book *A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, does not depend on that assumption. He asks us to consider the entire totality of events that occur in the world of space and time. Why did this history occur rather than some other? Clarke says that there are two possibilities: The entire history occurred for no reason at all, or it was brought into existence by a being who exists outside of space and time, namely, God. Clarke rejected the first suggestion as patently absurd; there *must* be a reason why the world is comprised of one total history rather than another. That reason is God. Clarke's argument is an instance of the cosmological argument.

If science is incapable of explaining why the world of space and time includes one total history rather than another, should we accept the claim that God exists because this hypothesis, if true, would explain this global fact? In similar fashion, should we accept the claim that God exists because it is able to explain why there is something rather than nothing (a fact that science is unable to explain)?

THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN FALLACY, AGAIN

I think the answer to these questions is *no*. Once again, the Only Game in Town Fallacy needs to be considered. There is a second option besides accepting the only explanation available. This is to admit that there are things about the universe we don't understand *and never will*. Why there is something rather than nothing may be inherently inexplicable; the same may be true of the question of why the world contains one total set of events rather than another. I grant that *if* (1) there were an all-powerful God who exists outside of space and time and *if* (2) a God outside of the material world could nonetheless create a material world and *if* (3) God wanted to make the world nonempty, then this would explain why there is something rather than nothing in the spatiotemporal universe. These suppositions would explain the fact in question, but that doesn't show that this explanatory story is at all plausible.

CAUSALITY

To see what is problematic about this suggested explanation, consider the causal relationship it says exists between God and the totality of the material universe. God is outside of space and time, but nonetheless manages to bring the whole material world into existence. This causal relationship is extremely hard to understand.

Think of the causal relationships we discuss in science and in everyday life. For example, we say that throwing the rock at the window caused the window to break. Here a causal relationship is said to obtain between two events, each of which occurred at a particular place and at a particular time. This is characteristic of well-understood claims about causality; in this case, *causation is a relationship that obtains between events that occur within space and time*. This is why it is so puzzling to say that a God outside of space and time causes the world of space and time to come into being.

I think it is misleading to use the statement "God did it" as a substitute for the statement "I really can't explain why this or that fact is true." The first statement advances an explanation, while the second admits to not having one. If the existence of God is to explain something, it must have more going for it than the fact that the observation under consideration is otherwise inexplicable.

I said before that evolutionary theory cannot now explain why some species reproduce sexually while others don't. This doesn't mean evolutionists can't make vague pronouncements such as "the pattern is due to natural selection." This vague remark is available to anyone who wants to make it. No scientist, however, would regard this single sentence as a satisfying explanation. The question—the main question—would be *how* natural selection managed to produce the results it did. What made sexual reproduction advantageous in some species and asexual reproduction advantageous in others? It is this more detailed question that, to date, has not been answered satisfactorily. There is an analogy here with the theological case. The theologian can say "God did it." The evolutionist can say "natural selection did it." A scientist would regard the latter explanation as unsatisfying, because it is too short on details. Why should the theological explanation be taken any more seriously? Part of what is missing in the theological story is any indication of *how* or *why* God did what he did. This may help explain why the theological explanation of patterns of reproduction should not be embraced. A theological explanation so short on details leaves too many questions unanswered to be convincing. In this circumstance, perhaps it is more plausible to admit we don't understand than to pretend that "God did it" gives us much by way of understanding.

A similar diagnosis can be offered of why the theological explanation of why there is something rather than nothing is so unsatisfying. To say "God did it" is to leave too much unexplained. How is it possible for something outside of space and time to cause the entire spatiotemporal universe to come into being? Why should God have preferred to actualize this possible world rather than any of the others? To the degree that we don't understand these matters, we should conclude that the theological explanation is really not much of an explanation at all.

My conclusion is that science may not be able to explain everything. There are facts now known to be true that science has not been able to account for. And even if science progresses, as I expect it to do, there will remain facts that are intrinsically

resistant to scientific treatment. Not only has science not explained them yet, but also it never will, because it can't. Of course, we should be open to the possibility that explanations from outside of science may have some plausibility. My point here is that bringing in the existence of God is often to trade one mystery for another, with no net gain in our understanding.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON

Clarke's argument makes use of an idea that has long been influential in philosophy. It is called *The Principle of Sufficient Reason*. This principle asserts that everything that happens in nature has an explanation; nothing happens for no reason at all. What can be said in favor of this principle? Scientists seem to assume it, or something like it, when they address a new problem. Consider some body of facts that science is currently not able to explain. For example, what is it about the organization of the human brain that allows us to have *conscious experience*? Neuroscientists assume that there is an answer to this question. This is why they set themselves the task of finding a scientific explanation of consciousness. But what assurance do they have that such an explanation exists?

Maybe it would make sense for scientists to assume that consciousness has an explanation even if they have no evidence at all that such an explanation exists. After all, if they look for explanation, they may find one (if such an explanation exists). But if they don't even look for an explanation, they will certainly fail to find it, even if there is one to be had. This is a strategic argument for its being sensible to look for an explanation of consciousness. It is not an argument that offers evidence that such an explanation exists. The fact that scientists search for explanations without a guarantee that they will succeed is not evidence that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is true.

Review Questions

1. What is the difference between a global why-question and a local why-question?
2. Can science answer global why-questions? Why or why not?
3. Is it possible to have evidence that something exists without having an explanation for why the thing exists?
4. Consider the following argument: "If science can't explain some fact, but a theological story, if true, would explain that fact, then the fact is strong abductive evidence that the theological story is true." How is the Only Game in Town Fallacy relevant to assessing this argument?
5. What does it mean to say that causation is a relationship that obtains between events in space and time? If this were a correct claim about causation, what implications would it have for the idea that God explains the sorts of global facts discussed in this chapter?

Problems for Further Thought

1. Philosophers sometimes use the term *brute fact* to describe a fact that is so simple and obvious that it can't be justified or explained by appeal to any other fact. Consider the relationship between x and y described in the statement " $x = y$." This is the relationship of *identity*. This is a relationship that everything bears to itself; "the Eiffel Tower = the Eiffel Tower" is true, but "the Eiffel Tower = the Statue of Liberty" is false. What explains the fact that everything is self-identical? Is this true because of the way we use the identity sign "="? Is it a brute fact?
2. In this chapter, I claimed that nothing explains itself. In everyday speech, however, we talk about something's being "self-explanatory." What does this mean? Is there a conflict between what I've said about explanation and the everyday idea? We also use the term "self-starter" to describe some people. Does this conflict with the idea that nothing causes itself?
3. Blaise Pascal, a seventeenth-century philosopher whom I'll discuss in Chapter 10, once said, "The truth of religion lies in its very obscurity." What does this mean, and is it true?

CHAPTER 8

The Ontological Argument

The various arguments I've considered so far for the existence of God include premises we know to be true by experience. By using our senses (of sight, hearing, touch, etc.), we know that objects are in motion and that organisms are intricate and adapted to their environments. What is more, there is no other way to know these things; sensory experience is indispensable. Such propositions are called *a posteriori*. Notice the prefix *post*, meaning "after." An *a posteriori* truth is one that requires experience to be known (or justified). Accordingly, the arguments for the existence of God considered thus far are called *a posteriori* arguments.

A POSTERIORI AND A PRIORI

Are all propositions *a posteriori*? Many philosophers have thought there are propositions that can be known to be true by reason alone. These propositions are termed *a priori*. Note the word "prior"; such propositions are knowable prior to, or independently of, experience. Standard examples are mathematical truths and definitions. We can know that $7 + 3 = 10$ and that bachelors are unmarried merely by

thinking about the concepts involved. You don't have to do experiments or conduct surveys to find out whether such statements are true. Reason suffices.

Let's be clear on what it means to claim that a given proposition is *a priori*. To say that we know *a priori* that bachelors are unmarried doesn't mean we were born with the concepts of bachelorhood and marriage. For a proposition to be *a priori*, it isn't essential that the concepts contained in the proposition be *innate*. Maybe none of us is born with an understanding of the concept of a bachelor; maybe we must have various experiences to acquire that concept. Even if the concepts were acquired through experience, however, that wouldn't show the proposition fails to be *a priori*. To say that a proposition is *a priori* true means that *IF* you understand the concepts involved, then reason will suffice for you to decide that the proposition is true. Don't forget the *IF* in this idea. The idea that there is *a priori* knowledge doesn't require that there be innate concepts.

The Ontological Argument for the existence of God is an *a priori* argument. It aims to establish the truth of theism without reliance on any *a posteriori* premise. In particular, the idea is that we can prove that God must exist simply by examining the definition of the concept of God.

DEFINITIONS AND EXISTENCE

This should strike you as a very surprising thing to try to do. Consider other definitions. For example, a bachelor is by definition an adult unmarried male. The thing to notice about this definition is that it doesn't imply there are any bachelors. If you think about it, this seems to be true of most definitions. You can define what it is to be a unicorn or a golden mountain, but the definitions won't settle whether there are such things.

When we consider concepts such as *bachelor*, *unicorn*, or *golden mountain*, the definitions specify what it would take to be an individual of the kind in question; the definitions don't say whether there are zero, one, or many things of that kind. The Ontological Argument claims the concept of God is different: From the definition of the concept of God, the existence of God is supposed to follow.

So the proposition that bachelors are unmarried is *a priori*, whereas the proposition that bachelors exist is *a posteriori*. The definition doesn't imply the existence claim. Are there any nontheistic examples of existence claims that can be known *a priori*? Perhaps existence claims in mathematics furnish examples. If mathematics is *a priori*, then mathematical existence claims are *a priori*. So it is an *a priori* truth that there exists a prime number between 12 and 14. It is philosophically debatable whether there are any *a priori* truths at all. I won't discuss that issue here, however, but will go along with the idea that mathematical truths are *a priori*. This means that since mathematics contains existence claims, there are (I'll assume) at least some existence statements that are *a priori* true. It follows that if there is a mistake in the Ontological Argument for the existence of God, it isn't to be found in the fact that the argument maintains that some existence claims are *a priori* true.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that they achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

WILLIAM PALEY

The Design Argument

In this selection from his *Natural Theology* (1836 edition), William Paley elaborates an argument for the existence of God that traces back at least to the last of Aquinas's five ways. His discussion of how one interprets a watch found on a heath is one of the most famous analogies proposed in the history of philosophy. The term "natural theology" means that the author attempts to establish the existence and nature of God by the same methods used in the natural sciences—observation and reasoning.

In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there: I might possibly answer, that for any thing I knew to the contrary, it had laid there for ever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to shew the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a *watch* upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for any thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone? why is it not as admissible in the second case, as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, viz, that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e.g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none that would have answered the use that is now served by it. To reckon up a few of the plainest of these parts, and of their offices, all tending to one result:—We see a cylindrical box containing a coiled elastic spring, which, by its endeavor to relax itself, turns round the box. We next

observe a flexible chain (artificially wrought for the sake of flexure), communicating the action of the spring from the box to the fusee. We then find a series of wheels, the teeth of which catch in, and apply to each other, conducting the motion from the fusee to the balance, and from the balance to the pointer; and at the same time by the size and shape of those wheels so regulating that motion, as to terminate in causing an index, by an equable and measured progression, to pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the wheels are made of brass in order to keep them from rust; the springs of steel, no other metal being so elastic; that over the face of the watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of the work, but in the room of which, if there had been any other than a transparent substance, the hour could not be seen without opening the case. This mechanism being observed (it requires indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said, observed and understood), the inference, we think, is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers, who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction and designed its use.

I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion that we had never seen a watch made—that we had never known an artist capable of making one—that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed; all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and unknown artist's skill, if he be unseen and unknown, but raises no doubt in our minds of the existence and agency of such an artist, at some former time and in some place or other. Nor can I perceive that it varies at all the inference, whether the question arise concerning a human agent or concerning an agent of a different species, or an agent possessing in some respects a different nature.

II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The purpose of the machinery, the design, and the designer might be evident, in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made: still less necessary, where the only question is whether it were made with any design at all.

III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch concerning which we could not discover or had not yet discovered in what manner they conducted to the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not ascertain whether they conducted to that effect in any manner whatever. For, as to the first branch of the case, if by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in question, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in

our minds as to the utility or intention of these parts, although we should be unable to investigate the manner according to which, or the connection by which, the ultimate effect depended upon their action or assistance; and the more complex the machine, the more likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the second thing supposed, namely, that there were parts which might be spared without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that we had proved this by experiment, these superfluous parts, even if we were completely assured that they were such, would not vacate the reasoning which we had instituted concerning other parts. The indication of contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before.

IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence of the watch with its various machinery accounted for, by being told that it was one out of possible combinations of material forms; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have contained some internal configuration or other; and that this configuration might be the structure now exhibited; namely, of the works of a watch, as well as a different structure.

V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his inquiry more satisfaction, to be answered that there existed in things a principle of order, which had disposed the parts of the watch into their present form and situation. He never knew a watch made by the principle of order; nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct from the intelligence of the watchmaker.

VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so.

VII. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of metallic nature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law as the efficient, operative cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only the mode according to which an agent proceeds: it implies a power; for it is the order according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the law does nothing, is nothing. The expression, "the law of metallic nature," may sound strange and harsh to a philosophic ear; but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more familiar to him, such as "the law of vegetable nature," "the law of animal nature," or, indeed, as "the law of nature" in general, when assigned as the cause of phenomena, in exclusion of agency and power, or when it is substituted into the place of these.

VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his conclusion or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he knew nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his argument; he knows the utility of the end; he knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the end. These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of knowing little need not beget a distrust of that which he does know.

DAVID HUME

Critique of the Design Argument

In this selection from his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (1779), Hume describes a conversation between Cleanthes, Demea, and Philo. Hume did not publish this work during his lifetime, probably because he was apprehensive about what the public reaction would be.

Not to lose any time in circumlocutions, said Cleanthes, addressing himself to Demea, much less in replying to the pious declamations of Philo, I shall briefly explain how I conceive this matter. Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance—of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble, and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument *a posteriori*, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.

I shall be so free, Cleanthes, said Demea, as to tell you that from the beginning I could not approve of your conclusion concerning the similarity of the Deity to men, still less can I approve of the mediums by which you endeavor to establish it. What! No demonstration of the Being of God! No abstract arguments! No proofs *a priori*! Are these which have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers all fallacy, all sophism? Can we reach no farther in this subject than experience and probability? I will say not that this is betraying the cause of a Deity; but surely, by this affected candor, you give advantages to atheists which they never could obtain by the mere dint of argument and reasoning.

What I chiefly scruple in this subject, said Philo, is not so much that all religious arguments are by Cleanthes reduced to experience, as that they appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that inferior kind. That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the earth has solidity, we have observed a thousand and a thousand times; and when any new instance of this nature is presented, we draw without hesitation the accustomed inference. The exact similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event, and a stronger evidence is never desired nor sought after. But wherever you depart, in

the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak *analogy*, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After having experienced the circulation of the blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it takes place in Titius and Maevius; but from its circulation in frogs and fishes it is only a presumption, though a strong one, from analogy that it takes place in men and other animals. The analogical reasoning is much weaker when we infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our experience that the blood circulates in animals; and those who hastily followed that imperfect analogy are found, by more accurate experiments, to have been mistaken.

If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how that pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to consider.

It would surely be very ill received, replied Cleanthes; and I should be deservedly blamed and detested did I allow that the proofs of a Deity amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture. But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance? the economy of final causes? the order, proportion, and arrangement of every part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived that human legs may use them in mounting; and this inference is certain and infallible. Human legs are also contrived for walking and mounting; and this inference, I allow, is not altogether so certain because of the dissimilarity which you remark; but does it, therefore, deserve the name only of presumption or conjecture?

Good God! cried Demea, interrupting him, where are we? Zealous defenders of religion allow that the proofs of a Deity fall short of perfect evidence! And you, Philo, on whose assistance I depended in proving the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, do you assent to all these extravagant opinions of Cleanthes? For what other name can I give them? or, why spare my censure when such principles are advanced, supported by such an authority, before so young a man as Pamphilus?

You seem not to apprehend, replied Philo, that I argue with Cleanthes in his own way, and, by showing him the dangerous consequences of his tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion. But what sticks most with you, I observe, is the representation which Cleanthes has made of the argument *a posteriori*; and, finding that that argument is likely to escape your hold and vanish into air, you think it so disguised that you can scarcely believe it to be set in its true light. Now, however much I may dissent, in other respects, from the dangerous principle of Cleanthes, I must allow that he has fairly represented that argument, and I shall endeavor so to state the matter to you that you will entertain no further scruples with regard to it.

Were a man to abstract from everything which he knows or has seen, he would be altogether incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine what kind of scene the universe must be, or to give the preference to one state or situation of things above another. For as nothing which he clearly conceives could be esteemed impossible or

implying a contradiction, every chimera of his fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he assign just reason why he adheres to one idea or system, and rejects the others which are equally possible.

Again, after he opens his eyes and contemplates the world as it really is, it would be impossible for him at first to assign the cause of any one event, much less the whole of things, or of the universe. He might set his fancy a rambling, and she might bring him in an infinite variety of reports and representations. These would all be possible; but, being all equally possible, he would never of himself give a satisfactory account for his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience alone can point out to him the true cause of any phenomenon.

Now, according to this method of reasoning, Demea, it follows (and is, indeed, tacitly allowed by Cleanthes himself) that order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes, is not of itself any proof of design, but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that principle. For aught we can know *a priori*, matter may contain the source or spring of order originally within itself, as well as mind does; and there is no more difficulty in conceiving that the several elements, from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall into that arrangement. The equal possibility of both these suppositions is allowed. But, by experience, we find (according to Cleanthes) that there is a difference between them. Throw several pieces of steel together, without shape or form they will never arrange themselves so as to compose a watch. Stone and mortar and wood, without an architect, never erect a house. But the ideas in a human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable economy, arrange themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or house. Experience, therefore, proves that there is an original principle of order in mind, not in matter. From similar effects we infer similar causes. The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a machine of human contrivance. The causes, therefore, must be resembling.

I was from the beginning scandalized, I must own, with this resemblance which is asserted between the Deity and human creatures, and must conceive it to imply such a degradation of the Supreme Being as no sound theist could endure. With your assistance, therefore, Demea, I shall endeavor to defend what you justly call the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine nature, and shall refute this reasoning of Cleanthes, provided he allows that I have made a fair representation of it.

When Cleanthes had assented, Philo, after a short pause, proceeded in the following manner.

That all inferences, Cleanthes, concerning fact are founded on experience, and that all experimental reasonings are founded on the supposition that similar causes prove similar effects, and similar effects similar causes, I shall not at present much dispute with you. But observe, I entreat you, with what extreme caution all just reasoners proceed in the transferring of experiments to similar cases. Unless the cases be exactly similar, they repose no perfect confidence in applying their past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every alteration of circumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event; and it requires new experiments to prove certainly that the new circumstances are of no moment or importance. A change in bulk, situation, arrangement, age, disposition of the air,

or surrounding bodies—any of these particulars may be attended with the most unexpected consequences. And unless the objects be quite familiar to us, it is the highest temerity to expect with assurance, after any of these changes, an event similar to that which before fell under our observation. The slow and deliberate steps of philosophers here, if anywhere, are distinguished from the precipitate march of the vulgar, who, hurried on by the smallest similitude, are incapable of all discernment or consideration.

But you can think, Cleanthes, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken when you compared to the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines; and, from their similarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes? Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred others which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause by which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn anything concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?

But allowing that we were to take the *operations* of one part of nature upon another for the foundation of our judgment concerning the *origin* of the whole (which never can be admitted), yet why select so minute, so weak, so bounded a principle as the reason and design of animals is found to be upon this planet? What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call *thought*, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our own favor does indeed present it on all occasions, but sound philosophy ought carefully to guard against so natural an illusion.

So far from admitting, continued Philo, that the operations of a part can afford us any just conclusion concerning the origin of the whole, I will not allow any one part to form a rule for another part if the latter be very remote from the former. Is there any reasonable ground to conclude that the inhabitants of other planets possess thought, intelligence, reason, or anything similar to these faculties in men? When nature has so extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small globe, can we imagine that she incessantly copies herself throughout so immense a universe? And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to this narrow corner and has even there so limited a sphere of action, with what propriety can we assign it for the original cause of all things? The narrow views of a peasant who makes his domestic economy the rule for the government of kingdoms is in comparison a pardonable sophism.

But were we ever so much assured that a thought and reason resembling the human were to be found throughout the whole universe, and were its activity elsewhere vastly greater and more commanding than it appears in this globe; yet I cannot see why the operations of a world constituted, arranged, adjusted, can with any propriety be extended to a world which is in its embryo-state, and is advancing

towards that constitution and arrangement. By observation we know somewhat of the economy, action, and nourishment of a finished animal; but we must transfer with great caution that observation to the growth of a foetus in the womb, and still more to the formation of an animalcule in the loins of its male parent. Nature, we find, even from our limited experience, possesses an infinite number of springs and principles which incessantly discover themselves on every change of her position and situation. And what new and unknown principles would actuate her in so new and unknown a situation as that of the formation of a universe, we cannot, without the utmost temerity, pretend to determine.

A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very imperfectly discovered to us; and do we thence pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole?

Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not, at this time, in this minute globe of earth, an order or arrangement without human art and contrivance; therefore, the universe could not originally attain its order and arrangement without something similar to human art. But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former? Is it a rule for the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe? Is nature in one situation a certain rule for nature in another situation vastly different from the former?

And can you blame me, Cleanthes, if I here imitate the prudent reserve of Simonides, who, according to the noted story, being asked by Hiero, *What God was?* desired a day to think of it, and then two days more; and after that manner continually prolonged the term, without ever bringing in his definition or description? Could you even blame me if I had answered, at first, *that I did not know*, and was sensible that this subject lay vastly beyond the reach of my faculties? You might cry out sceptic and railer, as much as you pleased; but, having found in so many other subjects much more familiar the imperfections and even contradictions of human reason, I never should expect any success from its feeble conjectures in a subject so sublime and so remote from the sphere of our observation. When two *species* of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can *infer*, by custom, the existence of one wherever I *see* the existence of the other; and this I call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have place where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me with a serious countenance that an orderly universe must arise from some thought and art like the human because we have experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning it were requisite that we had experience of the origin of the worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance. . . .

Philo was proceeding in this vehement manner, somewhat between jest and earnest, as it appeared to me, when he observed some signs of impatience in Cleanthes, and then immediately stopped short. What I had to suggest, said Cleanthes, is only that you would not abuse terms, or make use of popular expressions to subvert philosophical reasonings. You know that the vulgar often distinguish reason from experience, even where the question relates only to matter of fact and existence,

though it is found, where that *reason* is properly analyzed, that it is nothing but a species of experience. To prove by experience the origin of the universe from mind is not more contrary to common speech than to prove the motion of the earth from the same principle. And a caviller might raise all the same objections to the Copernican system which you have urged against my reasonings. Have you other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move?

Yes! cried Philo, interrupting him, we have other earths. Is not the moon another earth, which we see to turn round its center? Is not Venus another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon? Are not the revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same theory? All the planets, are they not earths which revolve about the sun? Are not the satellites moons which move round Jupiter and Saturn, and along with these primary planets round the sun? These analogies and resemblances, with others which I have not mentioned, are the sole proofs of the Copernican system; and to you it belongs to consider whether you have any analogies of the same kind to support your theory.

In reality, Cleanthes, continued he, the modern system of astronomy is now so much received by all inquirers, and has become so essential a part even of our earliest education, that we are not commonly very scrupulous in examining the reasons upon which it is founded. It is now become a matter of mere curiosity to study the first writers on that subject who had the full force of prejudice to encounter, and were obliged to turn their arguments on every side in order to render them popular and convincing. But if we peruse Galileo's famous *Dialogues* concerning the system of the world, we shall find that that great genius, one of the sublimest that ever existed, first bent all his endeavors to prove that there was no foundation for the distinction commonly made between elementary and celestial substances. The schools, proceeding from the illusions of sense, had carried this distinction very far; and had established the latter substances to be ingenerable, incorruptible, unalterable, impassible; and had assigned all the opposite qualities to the former. But Galileo, beginning with the moon, proved its similarity in every particular to the earth: its convex figure, its natural darkness when not illuminated, its density, its distinction into solid and liquid, the variations of its phases, the mutual illuminations of the earth and moon, their mutual eclipses, the inequalities of the lunar surface, etc. After many instances of this kind, with regard to all the planets, men plainly saw that these bodies became proper objects of experience, and that the similarity of their nature enabled us to extend the same arguments and phenomena from one to the other.

In this cautious proceeding of the astronomers you may read your own condemnation, Cleanthes; or rather may see that the subject in which you are engaged exceeds all human reason and inquiry. Can you pretend to show any such similarity between the fabric of a house and the generation of a universe? Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed under your eye, and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the phenomenon, from the first appearance of order to its final consummation? If you have, then cite your experience and deliver your theory.

SAINT ANSELM AND GAUNILO

The Ontological Argument

In this selection from the *Proslogion*, Saint Anselm attempts to provide an a priori proof of the existence of God. Gaunilo, a contemporary of Anselm's, presents two criticisms of the argument. In one of them, he claims that if Anselm's argument establishes the existence of God, then the existence of a perfect island would be provable a priori. Anselm replies to each of Gaunilo's criticisms.

ANSELM

Chapter II. That God Truly Is

O Lord, you who give understanding to faith, so far as you know it to be beneficial, give me to understand that you are just as we believe, and that you are what we believe.

We certainly believe that you are something than which nothing greater can be conceived.

But is there any such nature, since "the fool has said in his heart: God is not"?

However, when this very same fool hears what I say, when he hears of "something than which nothing greater can be conceived," he certainly understands what he hears.

What he understands stands in relation to his understanding (*esse in intellectu*), even if he does not understand that it exists. For it is one thing for a thing to stand in relation to our understanding; it is another thing for us to understand that it really exists. For instance, when a painter imagines what he is about to paint, he has it in relation to his understanding. However, he does not yet understand that it exists, because he has not yet made it. After he paints it, then he both has it in relation to his understanding and understands that it exists. Therefore, even the fool is convinced that "something than which nothing greater can be conceived" at least stands in relation to his understanding, because when he hears of it he understands it, and whatever he understands stands in relation to his understanding.

And certainly that than which a greater cannot be conceived cannot stand only in relation to the understanding. For if it stands at least in relation to the understanding, it can be conceived to be also in reality, and this is something greater. Therefore, if "that than which a greater cannot be conceived" only stood in relation to the understanding, then "that than which a greater cannot be conceived" would be something than which a greater can be conceived. But this is certainly impossible.

Therefore, something than which a greater cannot be conceived undoubtedly both stands in relation to the understanding and exists in reality.