History and Philosophy of Science 122:

Probability, Evidence, and Belief

Fall, 2012

Professor Joel Velasco

Class meets Tuesdays and Thursdays, 2:30-3:55 in BBB 3

This is a tentative schedule/reading list:

- Required Reading
- Fitelson, A Decision Procedure for Probability Calculus with Applications (first two sections)
- Lyon, The Philosophy of Probability (first two sections)
- Some handy probability facts (due to Titelbaum and Hájek)

- Extra Reading
- Fitelson's
**PrSAT**website - Eells, Appendix 1 of
*Probabilistic Causality* - Boolean Algebra Links: #1, #2, #3
- Appendix 2 of Ellery Eells's Probabilistic Causality
- Hájek, What Conditional Probability Could Not Be
- Easwaran, What Conditional Probability Must (Almost) Be
- Hájek, What Conditional Probability Also Could Not Be
- Skyrms, Zeno's Paradox of Measure
- Skyms, On Infinitesimals

- Fitelson's

- Required Readings
- Hájek, Interpretations of Probability,
*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(through 3.1) - van Fraassen, Indifference: The Symmetries of Probability
- van Fraassen - notes and references from Laws and Symmetry (we are reading chapter 12)
- Hájek, Interpretations of Probability,
*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(3.4 through end)

- Hájek, Interpretations of Probability,
- Extra Readings

- Required Reading
- Hájek, Interpretations of Probability,
*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(section 3.3) - Skyrms, Coherence (defends dutch books)
- Lewis, Why Conditionalize?
- Talbot, Dutch Book Arguments (an example of a diachronic dutch book)
- van Fraassen, Belief and the Will
- Handout on conditional betting

- Hájek, Interpretations of Probability,
- Extra Reading
- Skyrms, Coherence (chapter from
*Choice and Chance*). - Ramsey, Truth and Probability (the earliest dutch book argument and representation theorem)
- Kemeny, Fair Bets and Inductive Probabilities (proves the converse dutch book theorem)
- Hájek, Dutch Book Arguments
- Vineberg, The Notion of Consistency for Partial Beliefs
- Armendt, Dutch Books, Additivity, and Utility Theory
- Schick, Dutch Bookies and Money Pumps
- Weatherson, Begging the Question and Bayesianism
- Hájek, Scotching Dutch Books

- Skyrms, Coherence (chapter from

- Required Readings
- Christensen, Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs
- Maher, Diachronic Rationality
- Monty Hall Puzzle handout

- Extra Readings

- Required Readings
- Kyburg, Subjective Probability: Criticisms, Reflections, and Problems (a mistake in the paper)
- Eriksson and Hájek, What are Degrees of Belief?

- Extra Readings
- Christensen, Dutch Books Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers
- Maher, Depragmatized Dutch Book Arguments (against Christensen)
- Christensen, Preference Based Arguments for Probabilism
- Joyce, How Probabilities Reflect Evidence

- Required Reading
- Extra Reading
- Pettigrew, Epistemic Utility arguments for Probabilism (from Stanford Encyclopedia)
- Maher, Joyce's Arguments for Probabilism
- Seidenfeld, Calibration, Coherence, and Scoring Rules
- Joyce, Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
- Arntzenius, Swanson, and Gibbard, Replies to Gibbard and his response
- Hájek, Arguments for-or against-Probabilism
- Leitgeb and Pettigrew, An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy
- Leitgeb and Pettigrew, An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy
- Fitelson, Accuracy, Language Dependence and Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism
- Easwaran and Fitelson, An “Evidentialist” Worry About Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism

- Required Readings
- Sober, Evidence and Evolution (sections 1.1 through 1.4)

- Extra Readings
- Strevens, Bayesian Confirmation Theory
- Sober, An Introduction to Bayesian Epistemology (if you see funny symbols try downloading it and opening in adobe rather than online)
- Eagle, Introduction to Evidence and Probability: Bayesian Confirmation Theory from Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings
- Howson and Urbach, Bayesian vs. Non-Bayesian Approaches to Confirmation (originally from Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach)
- Sober, Bayesianism, its Scope and Limits
- Sober, Epistemology for Empiricists
- Earman & Salmon, The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses (parts 1 + 4), Chapter 2 of
*Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* - Maher, Confirmation Theory

- Instructions for the paper
- Generic statement on plagiarism
- How not to get BOCed (from Chris Hitchcock)
- Argument Clinic (from Chris Hitchcock)
- General advice for philosophy papers
- From Chris Hitchcock
- From Elliott Sober

- Required Readings
- Glymour, Why I am not a Bayesian
- Maher, Subjective and Objective Confirmation

- Extra Readings
- The New Math of Clinical Trials (the Bayesian doctor)
- xkcd #1132, xkcd #882

- Required Readings
- Christensen, Measuring Confirmation
- Eells and Fitelson, Measuring Confirmation and Evidence
- Eells and Fitelson, Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support

- Extra Readings
- Fitelson, The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity
- Hacking, Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability
- Garber, Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory
- Eells, Bayesian Problems of Old Evidence
- Joyce, How Probabilities Reflect Evidence

- Required Readings
- Dawid, Bayes's Theorem And Weighing Evidence by Juries
- Sesardic, Sudden Infant Death or Murder? A Royal Confusion About Probabilities
- From the Guardian, A Formula for Justice (Bayes' Theorem in the courtroom)

- Extra Readings
- Thompson and Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's Fallacy
- Macedo, Guilt by Statistical Association: Revisiting the Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Interrogator's Fallacy
- Colyvan et al., Is it a Crime to Belong to a Reference Class?
- Helpful website on Bioforensics: here
- Blog comments and citation for two historically important articles on statistics in the courtroom: here