Philosophy 184P:

Probability and Epistemology

Spring, 2010

Joel Velasco

joelv@stanford.edu

http://stanford.edu/~joelv/184/

Bld 380, Rm 380D M,W 12:30-1:45

Jeffrey, Richard C.,

Eells, Ellery,

Savage, Leonard J.,

- Mon, Mar 29
- Basic Logic and
Calculating with Probabilities
- Hacking, Ch 1-7
- Some handy probability facts (due to
Titelbaum and Hájek)
- Extra Reading
- Fitelson, A Decision Procedure for Probability Calculus with Applications
- Also, Fitelson's
**PrSAT**website

- Extra Reading

- Basic Logic and
Calculating with Probabilities
- Wed, Mar 31 NO CLASS
- Mon, Apr 5
- Probability: Axiomatic
- Appendix 2 of Ellery Eells's Probabilistic Causality
- Lyon, The Philosophy of Probability (first two sections)
- T. Williamson, How Probable is an Infinite Sequence of Heads?
- Extra Reading
- Weintraub, A Reply to Williamson
- J. Williamson, Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability
- Howson, De Finetti, Countable Additivity, Consistency and Coherence
- Skyrms, Zeno's Paradox of Measure
- Skyrms, On Infinitesimals (Appendix 4 from Causal Necessity)

- Extra Reading

- Probability: Axiomatic
- Wed, Apr 7
- Conditional Probability
- Hájek, What Conditional Probability Could Not Be
- Extra Reading

- Hájek, What Conditional Probability Could Not Be

- Mon, Apr 12
- Interpretations I
- Hacking, Ch 11 + 12
- Hájek, Interpretations of Probability,
*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(through 3.4) - van Fraassen, Indifference: The Symmetries of Probability
- van Fraassen - notes and references from Laws and Symmetry

- Extra Readings
- Huge list of interpretation readings (among other things) from Branden Fitelson's Probability and Induction course: Syllabus
- Principle of Indifference
- Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities
- Hacking, Equipossible Theories of Probability
- White, Evidential Symmetry
- Novack, A Defense of the Principle of Indifference
- Norton, Ignorance and Indifference
- Mikkelson, Dissolving the Wine/Water Paradox
- Marinoff, A Resolution of Bertrand's Paradox
- Shakel, Bertrand's Paradox and the Principle of Indifference

- Frequency Accounts
- von Mises, Probability, Statistics, and Truth
- Jeffrey, Mises Redux (in Probability and the Art of Judgment)
- van Fraassen, Relative Frequencies
- Hájek, "Mises Redux” — Redux: Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism
- Hájek, Fifteen Arguments against Hypothetical Frequentism
- Hájek, The Reference Class Problem is Your Problem Too

- More (unsorted...)
- Williamson, Motivating Objective Bayesianism
- Seidenfeld, Why I am not an Objective Bayesian
- Sober, The Reality of Macro-Probabilities
- Carnap, Two Concepts of Probability
- Carnap, Inductive Logic and Science
- Carnap, Statistical and Inductive Probability
- Maher, The Concept of Inductive Probability

- Wed, Apr 14
- interpretations II
- Gillies, Varieties of Propensity
- Eells, Objective Probability Theory Theory
- Extra Reading

- interpretations II
- Mon, Apr 19
- Subjective probability
- Hacking Ch 13 + 14
- Hájek, Interpretations of Probability,
*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(3.5)- Extra Reading

- Subjective probability
- Wed, Apr 21
- Dutch books
- Skyrms, Coherence
- Christensen, Dutch Books Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers
- Extra Reading
- Vineberg, The Notion of Consistency for Partial Beliefs
- Armendt, Dutch Books, Additivity, and Utility Theory
- Christensen, Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs
- Schick, Dutch Bookies and Money Pumps
- Maher, Depragmatized Dutch Book Arguments
- Weatherson, Begging the Question and Bayesianism
- Hájek, Scotching Dutch Book

- Extra Reading

- Dutch books
- Mon, Apr 26
- More on Dutch Books
- Hájek, Dutch Book Arguments

- More on Dutch Books
- Wed, Apr 28
- How are degrees of belief and chances related?
- Lewis, A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance
- Extra Reading

- Lewis, A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance

- How are degrees of belief and chances related?
- Mon, May 3
- Joyce probabilism
- Joyce, A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
- Extra Reading
- Maher, Joyce's Arguments for Probabilism
- Seidenfeld, Calibration, Coherence, and Scoring Rules
- Gibbard, Rational Credence and the Value of Truth

- Extra Reading

- Joyce, A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism

- Joyce probabilism
- Wed, May 5
- Probabilism II
- Eriksson and Hájek, What are Degrees of Belief?
- Extra Reading
- Joyce, How Probabilities Reflect Evidence
- Joyce, Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
- Hájek, Arguments for-or against-Probabilism
- Leitgeb and Pettigrew, An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy
- Leitgeb and Pettigrew, An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy

- Extra Reading

- Eriksson and Hájek, What are Degrees of Belief?

- Probabilism II

# Unit 3: Bayesian Epistemology

- Mon, May 10
- Conditionalization 1
- Hacking Ch 15
- Lewis, Why Conditionalize?
- Teller, Conditionalization and Observation
- Kyburg, Conditionalization
- Extra Readings
- Williamson, Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian Conditionalisation and Voluntarism
- Bacchus, Kyburg, and Thalos, Against Conditionalization
- Lange, Calibration and the Epistemological Role of Conditionalization

- Extra Readings

- Conditionalization 1
- Wed, May 12
- On Jeffrey Conditionalization
- Jeffrey, Probable Knowledge
- Extra Readings
- Field, A Note on Jeffrey Conditionalization
- Garber, Discussion: Field and Jeffrey Conditionalization
- Diaconis and Zabell, Updating Subjective Probability

- Extra Readings

- Jeffrey, Probable Knowledge

- On Jeffrey Conditionalization
- Mon, May 17
- Conditionalization 2: Reflection
- van Fraassen, Belief and the Will
- van Fraassen, Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens
- Briggs, Distorted Reflection
- Extra Reading
- Talbott, Two Principles of Bayesian Epistemology
- Green and Hitchcock, Reflections on Reflection: van Fraassen on Belief
- Arntzenius, Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection
- Weisberg, Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge

- Extra Reading

- Conditionalization 2: Reflection
- Wed, May 19
- Sleeping Beauty
- Elga, Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem
- Lewis, Sleeping Beauty: A Reply to Elga
- Arntzenius, Reflections on Sleeping Beauty
- Extra Reading
- Hitchcock, Beauty and the Bets
- Bradley and Leitgeb, When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart
- Titelbaum, The Relevance of Self-Locating Belief

- Extra Reading

- Sleeping Beauty

# Unit 4: Bayesian and Mainstream Epistemology

- Mon, May 24
- Acceptance
- Kaplan, Rational Acceptance
- Kaplan, A Bayesian Theory of Rational Acceptance
- Eells, On a Recent Theory of Rational Acceptance
- Extra Readings

- Acceptance
- Wed, May 26
- The Lottery Paradox
- Hawthorne and Bovens, The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief
- Wheeler, A Review of the Lottery Paradox
- Extra Readings
- Sturgeon, Reason and the Grain of Belief
- Sturgeon, Belief, Reason, and Logic

- Extra Readings

- The Lottery Paradox
- Mon, May 31
- Criticisms of Bayesian Epistemology

- Extra Readings

- Wed, Jun 2
- Final words?
- Hájek and Hartmann, Bayesian Epistemology
- Extra Readings

- Hájek and Hartmann, Bayesian Epistemology

- Final words?

# Extra topics you might be interested in:

- Higher order degrees of belief
- Skyrms, Higher Order Degrees of Belief
- Skyrms, Structure of Radical Probabilism

- Representation Theorems + Utilities
- Hacking Ch 8-10
- Zynda, Representation Theorems and Realism about Degrees of Belief
- Christensen, Preference Based Arguments for Probabilism
- Meacham and Weisberg, Rejecting Representationalism

- confirmational holism 1
- Christensen, Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology
- Strevens, The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses
- Fitelson and Waterman, Reply to Strevens
- Strevens, Reply to Fitelson and Waterman
- Fitelson and Waterman, Reply #2

- Sober, Likelihoods, Model Selection, and the Quine-Duhem Problem

- confirmational holism 2
- Sober, Mathematics and Indispensability
- Colyvan, Contrastive Empiricism and Indispensability
- Colyvan, Confirmation and Indispensability
- Extra Reading

- Joyce, Bayesianism
- Weisberg, Varieties of Bayesianism
- Hellman, Bayes and Beyond
- Howson, The Logic of Bayesian Probability
- Bayes, An Essay Toward Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances
- Sober, Introduction to Bayesian Epistemology
- Sober, Bayesianism: Its Scope and Limits

- Logical Omniscience
- Hacking, Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability
- Garber, Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory
- Eells, Bayesian Problems of Old Evidence
- Glymour, Why I am not a Bayesian
- Jeffrey, Bayesianism with a Human Face
- Stalnaker, The Problem of Logical Omniscience I, II

- Bayesian Confirmation Theory

- Interpretations I